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The Shareholder-Optimal Design of
Cash Balance Pension Plans
Abstract
In 1980 and 1981, Fischer Black and Irwin Tepper showed that
shareholders would gain if corporate defined benefit pension assets were
invested in taxable fixed income securities instead of equities.  This paper
extends this analysis into the cash balance plan arena, concluding that
additional shareholder gains arise when plan liabilities mimic equities.  A
numerical example demonstrates that the present value of riskless gains
to shareholders can exceed the entire after-tax value of plan assets.
Lack of transparency in actuarial methods and assumptions is shown to
impede implementation.
I Introduction
From Modigliani-Miller to Black and Tepper, Briefly
The capital structure literature that begins with the indifference propositions of Modigliani
and Miller (1958), divides into two major branches.  While one considers bankruptcy
issues and their challenge to structural indifference, the other focuses on tax concerns.
This tax branch includes Miller (1977) which considers "gains from leverage" as a
function of the tax rates applicable to corporations )( ct , to individuals holding bonds
)( pbt  and to individuals holding stocks )( pst  and solves for a leverage-indifferent
relationship between these rates:
)-()-)(-( pbpsc ttt 111 =
Treynor (Bagehot, 1972) introduces the idea of the "augmented balance sheet" to
address the corporate structure role of the defined benefit (DB) pension.  This approach
depicts the pension plan as a transparent financial subsidiary of the corporation.
Treynor asserts a financial integration of the corporation and the plan which deliberately
ignores the separation of the entities under law and regulation.  Although, the 1974
passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) strengthens the legal
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separation, the Treynor paradigm prevails in the literature.  The present paper, for the
most part, continues this tradition.
Sharpe (1976) observes that the establishment, by ERISA, of the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) creates a put option for pension plans which may be
exercised (with restrictions) to the advantage of the plan and the corporation when plan
liabilities exceed plan assets.  Subsequent legislation has substantially tightened the
restrictions and reduced the importance of the "PBGC put".  This put and an "excise tax
call" (characterized as such for the first time herein) enacted in a series of steps during
the late 1980's are discussed further in Appendix D.
Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) combine the tax branch descended from Modigliani-
Miller and the augmented balance sheet approach of Treynor to conclude that the assets
of corporately sponsored defined benefit pension plans should be invested entirely in
fixed income securities subject to high rates of tax.  The plan liabilities are modeled by
each author as exogenous and bond-like.  The recommended fixed-income investment
strategy will allow favorable hedging at the corporate level (Black) or in the hands of
shareholders (Tepper); a tax-arbitrage that represents a gain to shareholders in
comparison to the common practice that includes substantial equity investments in
corporate pension portfolios.
The subsequent literature has been primarily empirical and has generally concluded1
that corporate plan sponsors have not availed themselves of the tax benefits outlined in
the Tepper and Black papers.
New directions
This paper extends the work of Tepper and Black into the present arena which includes
a new type of pension plan called "Cash Balance".  The next subsection details the
features of these plans.
Although almost every Cash Balance (CB) plan in existence today has liabilities that
closely resemble bank accounts or short-term cash investments, we endogenize the
                                               
1 A recent exception may be found in Myers (1999).
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liability investment type and conclude that the tax-arbitrage benefit to shareholders will
be maximized by equity returns to participant accounts.  Consistent with Tepper and
Black, we conclude that plan assets should be invested entirely in fixed income.
We also review the claim by Black and Tepper that their approaches produce arbitrage
gains and we conclude that they are correct when the common practice or status quo is
the starting point for measure.  When we consider plans without surplus assets, we find
that there is no opportunity to profit from a DB plan (in comparison to cash compensation
or defined contribution (DC) plan substitutes) unless liability returns are equity based.
The Tepper and Black approaches merely undo the tax-arbitrage losses inflicted by plan
sponsors upon themselves.
Our primary model assumes that the participants are indifferent to the liability measure
(in effect, their total compensation is exogenous and unvarying).  We go beyond the
primary model in a subsection entitled "Employee choice plans – closer to equilibrium" at
the end of Section V.  Therein, symmetry motivates us to look for tax-arbitrage losses on
the part of participants.  We find some losses but also observe that various conditions
may cause such losses to be much less than the gains to shareholders.  From this we
conclude that contract-improving arrangements may be made between the shareholders
and the employees (within the structure of the corporation) to the detriment of taxpayers
in general.  A practical contract improvement can be achieved simply by allowing
individual employees to choose the liability benchmark that they prefer on a continuum
from all-equities to all-fixed-income.
We also consider an entirely original approach (a "CBSOP") wherein the employee
benchmark choices would include stock in the sponsoring corporation.  This would
improve upon an admitted weakness in the Black hedging approach.  Regulatory
impediments might prove intractable, however.
Because the focus of the entire literature line from Modigliani-Miller through Black and
Tepper is on a single firm that is presumed to deal in securities (including its own) in a
liquid and deep market that makes each agent a price-taker, none of these analyses
(including the present one) describe general equilibria.  The endogenization of the
liabilities and the contract-improving employee choice parts of this paper move in the
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direction of a wider equilibrium.  In the subsection entitled "Upsetting the Equilibrium" in
Section IV, we ask and briefly reply to the equilibrium-seeking question: what would
happen to the equity risk premium if the lessons of Tepper and Black and this paper
were widely adopted by corporations?  Because we do not endogenize the taxpayers or
the government we stop well short of general equilibrium2.
This paper also addresses the issue, hinted at by Black, of the diversification effects that
arise when corporations invest their pension assets in the equity of other corporations.
We show that, absent bankruptcy issues, such diversification is valueless to
shareholders and that they will act to unwind its effects and restore their effective
portfolios to their original holdings of the underlying corporate assets.  This in turn
produces an interesting observation about the correct definition of the market portfolio.
To the extent, if any, that corporate pension assets are supported by corporate equity
capital, the capitalization of the market portfolio is seemingly increased (by the exchange
of pieces of paper alone).  Because U.S. pension funds hold a sizable fraction of the
market portfolio, a multiplier or leveraging effect may be revealed.
We reconcile the Black and Tepper approaches and derive the necessary and sufficient
tax conditions for them to achieve identical arbitrage gains.  Delightfully, and  intuitively,
this turns out to be the set of rates that satisfy Miller's leverage-indifference criterion.
Black and Tepper, writing when they did, did not need to respond to a question which
today's writer must address:  if the arbitrage gains are genuine and substantial, as
claimed, why does it appear that so few corporations have adopted the Tepper-Black
investment strategies?  We hypothesize that opaque and perverse actuarial methods
and assumptions provide strong motivation to act in contradiction of the strategy.  To this
end we demonstrate that (Section VI), under an actuarial regime, the common practice
wherein liabilities are fixed and assets include equities allows sponsors to provide a
dollar's worth of employee account balances at a substantial discount.  This same
                                               
2 The partial equilibrium environment of corporate finance pension papers is in contrast to the
literature that addresses the future of the U.S. Social Security system.  The pervasiveness of
Social Security makes it necessary that its literature deal with general equilibria.  Some of the
indifference results of that literature (e.g., Smetters, 1997, Proposition 1) bear a superficial
resemblance to our pre-tax Result 1 but reasoning by analogy beyond that point is not
supportable.
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actuarial regime causes the shareholder-optimal strategy (determined under a
transparent regime) to result in a cost of more than one sponsor dollar per employee
dollar.  This issue is explored in a broader and deeper fashion in a subsequent paper.
The Tepper and Black models address one year at a time.  Because their strategy for
investment as applied to a fixed liability plan constitutes an asset-liability match, the
implications over several years may be represented by fixed rate perpetuities (Tepper).
Because our strategy, that defines liability benchmarks as equities, mismatches assets
and liabilities, we have added a subsection (Some Dynamic Considerations) in Section V
that looks at some of the ensuing dynamics.
Because the tax-arbitrage maximizing strategy for cash balance plans is not an asset-
liability match, we note that bankruptcy concerns may discourage full implementation for
weaker companies.  We also note that the excise tax call may rein in the tax gains for
overfunded plans when, subsequent to implementation, the equity market declines
substantially over time.  In a transparent environment, reductions to gains that derive
from these sources constitute an agency cost attributable to a need for risk capital.
This paper is timely in two regards.  First, the current controversy over cash balance
plans may be mitigated by plan sponsors' incorporation of equity-based liabilities and
employee choice.  Second, the existence of cash balance plans has made the long-
standing dissonance between the actuarial process and a transparent examination more
obvious.  How is it possible for a $1 credit to an employee account (that is nonforfeitable
and generally immune to default) to cost the employer substantially less than $1 (a pre-
tax to pre-tax comparison) and how is it possible that a contemporaneous change of
asset allocation can change the cost of that $1 credit?  In the context of a traditional DB
plan, these questions could not be so easily framed, despite the fact that the underlying
actuarial distortion pervades valuations of both CB and traditional DB plans.
Cash balance plans
Much of the recent publicity concerning cash balance pension plans sponsored by U.S.
corporations has focused on the controversy that attaches to their implementation as
conversions of traditional defined benefit pension plans.  This controversy is tangential to
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the main thesis of this paper.  My thesis, derived as an extension to the work of Fischer
Black (1980) and Irwin Tepper (1981), is that the shareholders will be able to achieve
gains from tax arbitrage if the plans promise equity-based investment credits and invest
the plan assets entirely in taxable fixed income securities.
This strictly contradicts the common practice of cash balance plan sponsors who
typically promise investment crediting rates based on fixed income benchmarks and
invest the plan assets in a diversified mix that is more than half allocated to equities.
This results in tax arbitrage losses to shareholders.
Because a cash balance plan is a special form of defined benefit plan, its primary
financial aspects are transmitted to shareholders through an actuarial filter.  This filter
smoothes the cash flows from the corporation to the plan, smoothes the expenses
(income) reported by the plan and anticipates returns on risky investments before the
risks have been borne (Gold, 1999).  The actuarial use of expected returns on assets
with little or no attention paid to the stochastic distribution of returns implies, incorrectly,
that the common practice is a profitable strategy.  The actuarial firm that invented the
cash balance plan, in its introductory publication (Kwasha Lipton, 1985) said “A ‘5% of
pay plan’ might require a contribution of only 4% of pay, after a realistic investment
differential is taken into account.”
A key element of our analysis is the assumption of transparency with respect to the
financial intermediary that is the corporation’s pension plan.  This implies that a vested
compensation credit equal to 5% of pay cannot be financed at any cost less than 5% of
pay.  Why such transparency may not regularly prevail is discussed in Section VI and in
a subsequent paper.
Some basic definitions
Retirement plans sponsored by corporate employers in the United States may be one of
two types.  These are explained by McGill et al (1996)3:
                                               
3 Pp. 27-28.
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· “One approach is to establish and maintain a pension plan that promises a
determinable set of benefits at retirement…  The plan sponsor, typically the
employer, undertakes to provide the funds, through periodic contributions and
investment earnings on the plan assets, that are needed to pay the promised
benefits as they become payable… this type of plan is identified in pension literature
as a defined benefit [DB] plan.  It is characterized by definitely determinable
benefits… and by indeterminable future costs.”
· “The other approach is to specify the basis on which contributions will be made to the
plan, with no contractual commitment as to the level of benefits that will be provided.
Individual accounts are maintained for the participants, the accounts being credited
with their allocable share of employer (and employee) contributions and investment
earnings…  In contrast to the defined benefit approach, the employer’s future cost,
as a percentage of covered payroll, is known in advance; but the amount of
retirement benefit is not determinable in advance…  Thus it may be that the future
cost of the plan is predictable but the benefits are unpredictable.  This approach to
retirement planning is known as a defined contribution [DC] plan, also referred to
as an individual account plan.”  [bolding and abbreviation added].
A DC plan is a "pass-through" financial entity much like a mutual fund or a mutual fund
family; the assets and liabilities are always equal in amount and all of the plan assets
may be assigned to individual participant accounts.  A DB plan, on the other hand, is a
financial intermediary that is more analogous to a bank or an insurance company; the
liabilities are promises made by the plan to the participants; the aggregate assets, not
generally equal to the aggregate liabilities, serve to collateralize the promises.
A Cash Balance [CB] plan is known as a “hybrid” because it combines some elements
of each of the above plan types. The primary feature borrowed from DC plans is the
individual account balance which accumulates for each participant.  Thus, from a
participant perspective, a CB plan looks much like a DC plan.
Almost every other aspect of CB plans, including actuarial methodology, GAAP
accounting and statutory qualification under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) and the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) conform to the DB model.  From a
regulatory perspective, a CB plan is a special type of DB plan.  Virtually every cash
balance plan in existence today has come about as a conversion of (via plan
amendments to) an older defined benefit plan.
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Using the mutual fund versus bank or insurance company distinction above, it is fair to
say that the CB plan is most like a bank because the participant liabilities are
represented by account balances while the traditional DB plan is most like an insurance
company because the participant liabilities are primarily annuities.  Importantly, the
mutual fund analogy applicable to DC plans applies neither to the traditional nor to the
CB type of defined benefit plan.
All of the assets of defined contribution plans are allocated to individual employee
accounts and the sum of the account balances is equal to the total assets of the plan.  In
contrast, under a cash balance plan, the account balances are notional and the
aggregate of the individual account balances will only equal the total plan assets by rare
coincidence.  The assets of cash balance plans, like those of other DB plans, are held
unallocated on behalf of the entire plan and serve the primary purpose of providing
collateral for the benefit promises of the plan.
The traditional defined benefit plan may be understood to hold a long position in the
various assets of the plan and to be short the benefits promised to the employees (the
accrued liabilities).  Since the accrued liabilities of a cash balance plan are the account
balances, the CB plan may be understood as a financial entity that is long its various
assets and short the account balances of its participants.
Cash balance plans utilize two elements to control the development of plan balances in
a fashion that mimics the operation of DC plans:
· Periodic additions to account balances are credited as a function of the employee’s
compensation.  These additions are called compensation credits; the percentage
of compensation is called the compensation crediting rate.  Typical compensation
crediting rates are single digit percentages that are usually constant but may, in
accordance with plan rules, vary with the age and/or service of the employee.
· Account balances also receive investment credits based on an investment
crediting rate.  The rate may be benchmarked to a marketed security (e.g., the one-
year T-bill rate) or set arbitrarily (e.g., 7%).  Usually the rate is fixed in advance for a
period of no longer than one year.
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Subject usually to a vesting schedule, a terminating employee is entitled to receive the
current account balance.  Various other options including periodic annuity benefits
commencing at a later date are usually available.
Controversial current events
In the last several years, the pace of major company conversions of traditional DB plans
into CB plans has increased.  The motivations for the conversions are outlined in
Section II.  One important motivation is a change in the pattern of accrual of benefits
over an employee’s career (Appendix A).  In the last year, a substantial controversy has
arisen focusing on the conversion process (which almost invariably leads to a reduction
in projected retirement benefits for some currently employed plan participants).  Some
mitigation of these reductions may be effected by a transition treatment (Appendix B).
Typically the oldest and longest service employees are protected by “grandfather” rights
which allow them to finish their careers under the old plan provisions.  Many mid-career
participants who are not grandfathered, however, are likely to be disappointed.  Their
degree of disappointment depends on the transition methodology as outlined in the
appendix.  Those who are subjected to a “wearaway” transition are likely to be
particularly upset.
Remaining sections
Section II discusses the history of cash balance plans, the motivations that lead
employers to convert existing DB plans to CB plans, and the varying impact that this has
on their current employees.  Section III presents the assumptions and philosophy of the
model (Section IV) that represents the heart of this paper.  Section V presents the
implications of the model results.  Section VI discusses impediments to implementation.
Conclusions are summarized in Section VII.
II Why Corporations are Converting to Cash Balance Plans
A brief history
From the 1940’s through the 1970’s the traditional defined benefit plan provided an
efficient method for employers to enable and encourage the retirement of their
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superannuated employees.  These employees were, at least early in the period,
predominantly male heads of nuclear families who were likely to spend the bulk of their
careers with one or two employers.
The design of the plans provided incentives for employees to remain with the same
employer, particularly from ages 35 through 55 and then, depending on the degree to
which the plan subsidized early retirement, encouraged them to retire in the period from
age 55 to 65.
The 1970’s were a period that challenged traditional defined benefit plans.  ERISA,
adopted in 1974, provided federal insurance protection for employee pensions, created
standards for minimum funding, enhanced nondiscrimination, vesting, benefit accruals,
fiduciary behavior, and disclosure.  Each of these features made traditional defined
benefit plans more expensive for employers to create and maintain.
The bear market in stocks in 1973 and 1974, accompanied by inflationary surges that
recurred several times during the 1970’s and into the early 1980’s, marked down the
plan assets and, since actuaries were slow to recognize rising interest rates, raised
(actuarially measured) plan liabilities.
Workforce trends towards more mobility and greater female participation accelerated in
the 1970’s leading to exposure of the weaknesses of defined benefit plans for those
whose careers were not largely spent working for one employer.
In the early 1980’s the pace of pension legislation increased substantially and, with each
layer of legislation, defined benefit plans became less attractive to employers.  In late
1981, the IRS issued regulations under IRC Section 401(k) which had been added to
ERISA by a 1978 act.  These regulations provided for pre-tax employee contributions
and thus made defined contribution plans an attractive alternative to defined benefit
plans.  While most of the large, financially strong corporations that are the focus of this
paper already had both DB and DC plans, employer-initiated plan improvements
thereafter were provided to 401(k) plans while defined benefit plans were cut back when
possible and enhanced only when new legislation made such changes necessary.
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During 1981, interest rates on long-term Treasury bonds exceeded 14%.  Actuarial
interest rates were still single digits.  This resulted in an overestimate of liabilities and in
contribution rates that were arguably much too high.  In the four following years, as the
stock market began a bullish trend that has not yet ended, the overfunding of many
corporate plans became evident.  A spate of plan terminations accompanied by the
reversion of surplus assets to employers followed.  This in turn led to additional
legislation, sponsored by Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D. Ohio, 1977-1995), imposing
and then sharply increasing excise taxes on these asset recaptures4 (Appendix C).
The invention of the Cash Balance plan
In 1984, Kwasha Lipton, a leading employee benefit consulting term, unveiled5 its newly
designed and newly named “Cash Balance” plan.  The first major employer to adopt
such a plan was Bank of America which did so in 1985.  In its explanatory material
issued at that time, Kwasha Lipton (1985) identified the following advantages provided
by the new design in comparison to traditional DB plans:
· “A basic distinguishing characteristic of the typical Cash Balance plan, as compared
to a traditional pension plan, is its relatively more generous treatment of younger
employees and employees who terminate before retirement.”
· “Age-independent credits represent equal pay for equal work, without discrimination
on the basis of age, sex or marital status.”
· “The company’s contribution is clear-cut and easily understood” 6
· “A range of [actuarial] funding methods is available.  Turnover and other expected
experience can be anticipated and discounted in advance, and gains and losses can
be amortized.”
                                               
4 10% excise tax on asset reversions, IRC Section 4980, added by Pub. L. 99-514, title XI,
Sec. 1132(a), for reversions after December 31, 1985.  Increased to 15% by Pub. L. 100-647,
title VI, Sec. 6069(a), for reversions after December 31, 1988.  Increased to 20% by Pub. L.
101-508, title, XII, Sec. 12001 which further provided a rate of 50% unless the employer used
at least 20% of the otherwise revertible assets to fund immediate benefit increases or at least
25% to fund a qualified replacement plan, for reversions after September 30, 1990.
5 Kwasha Lipton Partner Larry Brennan presented the concept at the Annual Fall Conference
of the Council on Employee Benefits in October of 1984.
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· “There is flexibility in the amount of funding from year to year…”
· “If the plan is overfunded, no cash outlay is required until the overfunding is
eliminated.”
· “The employer can invest for the long term”
· “If the plan outperforms the rates being credited to employees, the cost to the
sponsor will be reduced accordingly.”
· “The investment differential can be anticipated.”
· “As a defined benefit plan, a Cash Balance plan is entitled to PBGC7 protection
which is not available (or meaningful) to defined contribution plans.”
· “Benefit subsidies – over the years, most pension plans have adopted a variety of
benefit subsidies, typically geared toward facilitating early retirement or reducing the
cost of joint-and-survivor options.  Some companies may feel that these subsidies
have become cumbersome, expensive or unfair.  When that is the case, the
introduction of a Cash Balance plan may present an opportunity to eliminate or
rethink these subsidies.”
Fourteen years later, these observations still constitute a good summary of the positive
features of these plans.  The points above may be grouped into fewer categories: i)
portability for mobile workforces, ii) age-neutral benefit accrual patterns that better match
employee productivity, iii) tangible, comprehensible benefits that mirror defined
contribution plans, iv) actuarial flexibility and a potential profit for employers who invest
in equities while promising fixed income rates of return.
The first two items amount to something of a two-edged sword.  Portability (meaning
larger benefits for those who leave a particular employer early in their careers) raises the
per-retiree cost of providing benefits to those who remain with one employer until they
are old enough to retire.  As a result, the employer who wishes to remain cost neutral
must reduce the benefits for full service employees to pay for the portable benefits of
                                                                                                                                           
6 This must refer to the notional contribution added as a compensation credit since the actual
employer contributions are based on actuarial funding methodology that is neither clear-cut
nor easily understood.
7 The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation established by ERISA (1974).
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those who leave.  This introduces some of the transition issues that have aroused much
controversy during 1998 and 1999.
The defined benefit accrual pattern (discussed in detail with a graphical example in
Appendix A) encourages employees to remain in service (a reward for loyalty in the early
history of pension plan design) even after they have become less productive.  The pre-
cash balance approach has been to provide subsidized early retirement benefits and/or
“early retirement windows”8.  In effect, the high cost for older employees under traditional
defined benefit plans made it profitable to “bribe” employees to retire early.
Point iii has, until recently, been an unarguable plus for CB plans (an implied criticism of
DB plans).  The complexity of the DB plan that is being converted provided an
opportunity for employers to communicate the advantages of cash balance plans without
necessarily highlighting the disadvantages that fall upon long service employees in the
second half of their careers.  Weak or even misleading communication, cost neutral or
cost-savings conversions and the “wearaway” issue (Appendix B) have given rise to
employee protests, press coverage (Schulz, 1999) and Congressional attention.
Point iv is a financial illusion that is the central issue of this paper.  In Sections III and IV,
we show that the common practice of promising fixed income returns and investing in
equities results in losses to shareholders.  These losses are masked by actuarial and
accounting methodologies that support Kwasha Lipton’s claim, above, that “The
investment differential can be anticipated.”  The realities of marketed securities and risk
averse investors make this statement actuarially true but financially false.
Why not defined contribution?
One last question should be addressed as part of Why Corporations are Converting to
Cash Balance Plans.  Why not simply terminate the defined benefit plan and establish or
enrich an existing defined contribution plan?  While the fourth preceding item provides
one possible response, a compelling reason for many employers is found in the
Metzenbaum excise taxes.  Prior to the enactment of these taxes in 1986 and their sharp
                                               
8 A limited time offer by the pension plans to older employees of higher than usual benefits,
typically computed by adding service, age or compensation above the factual values.
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upward adjustments through 1990, sponsors of overfunded DB plans might have
considered the termination approach.  They would have incurred some tax inefficiency
since they would have had to pay income taxes when the plan surplus returned to the
corporation but subsequent contributions to the DC plan would have offset all but the tax
timing differential.  The excise taxes were intended to provide serious disincentives for
DB plan terminations.  They succeeded.  It is something of a coincidence that the CB
plans were invented just before the excise taxes were enacted.  What is not a
coincidence, however, is the use of CB plans as a tax-effective exit strategy for sponsors
of overfunded DB plans.  It is of some note that every CB plan adopted to date has been
a conversion of an existing DB plan.  It is as if all of the other argued advantages of CB
plans in comparison to DC plans (PBGC guarantees, funding flexibility, investment
profits) come to naught.
III Model Approach
We employ two models herein.  Each relies on plan investments in taxable fixed income
securities combined with investment crediting rates on plan balances based on equity
returns.  Each also relies on offsetting investment and/or financing arrangements
engaged in by the corporation and/or its shareholders.
The “Tepper” model traces the risks and returns of the pension plan through to the
hands of the shareholders.  The shareholders then undertake to neutralize the risks to
restore their previously preferred portfolio.  They borrow money (or sell fixed income
securities) and purchase equities.  We measure the after-effects of this riskless arbitrage
by looking at the changes in total tax liabilities of the shareholders.
The “Black” model follows the risks and returns of the pension plan to the after-tax
corporate balance sheet where they are neutralized by changes in the firm’s capital
structure.  This means repurchase of the firm’s own shares and an equal value issuance
of new corporate debt.  For diversified and optimized shareholders this might necessitate
the reallocation of their equity holdings between the shares of the plan sponsoring firm
and other firms.  We measure the effects of the Black model by looking at the tax
liabilities of the corporation.
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Assumptions
The models are based on the following assumptions about markets (A.1 through A.7),
about relative tax rates (A.8), about the operation of the CB plan (A.9 and A.10) and
about employee compensation (A.11):
A.1 The shares of the corporation are marketed (i.e., traded in an accessible liquid
market).
A.2 Shareholders hold diversified portfolios of assets chosen to reflect their preferred
distribution of returns.
A.3 Shareholders also hold some fixed income securities or else can borrow at the
market rate of interest.
A.4 Securities may be traded without transaction costs.
A.5 The plan holds, as assets, a portfolio of marketed securities.
A.6 Corporation and pension plan are ongoing; probability of bankruptcy is negligible.
A.7 Transparency: the market values of financial intermediaries accurately reflect the
marginal value of any marketed securities held.
A.8 Taxes: total returns on fixed income assets held by individuals are subject to
higher effective tax rates than are the total returns on equity assets; corporate
pension assets are taxed neither at the plan nor at the corporate level; corporate
contributions to pension plans are tax deductible.  Tax rates are fixed for all time
and companies and shareholders continue to pay taxes in their current bracket.
A.9 The demographic elements of the plan are sufficiently predictable to be modeled
without uncertainty.
A.10 The investment crediting rate to be applied to account balances is set periodically
in advance and is equal to the total return (whether positive or negative) for the
period on a benchmark portfolio comprised of marketed securities.
A.11 Each employee’s compensation, as well as the compensation crediting rate
applied thereto, is set without regard to the portfolio used to benchmark the
investment crediting rate and without regard to the plan asset amounts and
investment returns.
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A.6 means that we are focusing on generally well funded plans sponsored by successful
companies.  We exclude those plans that are so well funded that the plan sponsor
cannot, even over time, avoid excise taxes on excess assets.  (Appendix D).
A.7 is the most controversial assumption.  In the cash balance case, even though the
plan assets and liabilities may be readily valued in current dollars, the actuarial
methodology that CB plans inherit by virtue of their status as DB plans allows liabilities to
be arbitrarily valued and plan costs to bear only the slimmest relationship to the
changing current values of assets and liabilities.  Appendix E elaborates.
A.8 is discussed in Appendix I.
A.11 treats the employee compensation package as exogenous to the model and is one
of several ways in which the model falls short of being a general equilibrium model.  At
the end of Section V, we examine an alternative assumption which moves towards a
wider equilibrium.  Near the end of Section IV, we comment on the non-equilibrium result
that arises directly from both the Black and Tepper models and the direction that it
implies for the equity risk premium in equilibrium.  It should be noted that a tax arbitrage
model that does not incorporate governmental effects will never produce a general
equilibrium result.
IV Transparent Intermediary Model
With marketed assets and liabilities, without tax considerations
Consider a transparent intermediary without taxes:
  Let AP =  intermediary’s assets (all marketed)
  Let  LP =  intermediary’s liabilities (all marketed)
PPP  - L A Let  E =
and, since we have assumed transparency, PE  is the value of the intermediary.
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Consider a business entity with all values at market:
  Let AB =  business’ assets, valued at market
  Let  LB =  business’ liabilities, valued at market
BBB  - L A Let  E =
Attach the intermediary to the business entity (in the sense that a pension plan is
attached to a corporation).  Such an attachment follows the augmented balance sheet
concept introduced by Jack Treynor (Bagehot, 1972 and Treynor, Regan and Priest,
1976, 1978).  The following is based on Figure 1 in the 1978 article:
Augmented Balance Sheet
(at market value)
Assets Liabilities
=PA  Pension portfolio =PL  Present value of pension obligations
=BA  Corporate assets =BL  Corporate liabilities
=+= BP EEE  Corporate equity
Thus the composite corporate entity is valued at (market capitalization):
PPBB LALAE -+-=
We ask the question, how do shareholders of this corporation (presumed to be optimally
diversified) react to changes in the allocation of pension assets and liabilities?  We
conclude:
Result 1: Shareholders act to offset the pension asset allocation.  They are
able to do so at no cost and thereby restore their preferred
distribution of future wealth.  Thus they are indifferent to the
allocation of pension assets and liabilities among marketed
securities.
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Consider a shareholder holding his preferred diversified portfolio including his share of
interest in the business and the pension plan with its base case asset/liability allocation.
The shareholder learns that the pension plan will sell some of its assets and invest the
proceeds in other marketed securities.  Because the shareholder investment opportunity
set is identical to the pension plan’s, the shareholder will restore his preferred
investment allocation by purchasing the securities that the plan sells and by selling the
securities that the plan purchases.  Naturally, these transactions will be scaled to reflect
the fractional ownership of the corporation by the shareholder.  As a group, the
shareholders will sell (and buy) the same securities in the same amounts as the pension
plan buys (and sells).  In effect, all the transactions could occur between the plan and
the shareholder group with no participation by outside parties.
What happens when the plan liabilities are reallocated (i.e., benchmarked to a different
set of securities)?  As before, the shareholders have chosen their own portfolios in a
fashion that recognizes the long and the short positions of the corporate pension plan.
Thus each shareholder will adjust his own portfolio by buying the securities that are
added to the liability benchmark and will sell those that have been removed.  Later we
will consider the offsetting transactions that might be effected by plan participants
(Section V) but, for now, we assume that the shareholder transactions will involve third
party market participants.
These shareholder reactions preserve the current, and restore the future distributions of,
wealth for each shareholder.  Thus, we conclude that shareholders are indifferent to the
asset/liability allocations of the pension plan provided that the plan assets and liability
benchmarks are restricted to marketed securities.
When the investment crediting rate is not marketed
In many of the cash balance plans adopted to date, the investment crediting rate is set
once a year to a numerical quantity that may be set arbitrarily or may represent a market
rate on an instrument of maturity other than one-year (e.g., the current coupon rate on
the ten-year Treasury bond) or may be a rounded or adjusted version of some published
rate (e.g. prime rate or the one-year T-bill plus 1%).  How shall we understand this in
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light of the shareholders’ inclination to maintain a preferred investment strategy?  We
can interpret it as a riskless profit or loss to the shareholders:
Result 2: When the liability allocation changes from a marketed benchmark
to a marketed benchmark offset by a measurable amount, the
shareholder wealth changes by the amount of the offset.
Because the rate is set one year at a time shortly in advance of the beginning of the year
for which it is effective, the proper portfolio adjustment by the shareholders will entail the
purchase of the one-year T-bill on the announcement date of the plan’s investment rate.
If, for example, the plan credits a 7% annual effective rate on the prior year’s balance,
and the effective annual rate on the one-year bill is 5%, then each shareholder
immediately loses approximately 1.9% (2%/1.05) of his share of the aggregate opening
account balances of the plan.  In effect the plan is offering employees a near riskless
return of 7% when the market rate for such an investment is only 5%.  There is no
riskless investment strategy that the shareholder can use to reduce this loss.
Suppose instead that the plan credits investment returns equal to the S&P index less 1%
annually.  In this case, of course, the ending plan balances cannot be computed until the
S&P index is evaluated at year end.  Nonetheless, the riskless portfolio adjustment calls
for shareholders to purchase the S&P index which locks in a gain to the shareholders of
about .95% (1%/1.05, assuming the same T-bill rate as above) of the opening plan
balances.
With tax considerations
Next we consider taxes and define9:
stocks on ratetax  personal
bonds on ratetax  personal
ratetax  corporate
=
=
=
ps
pb
c  
t
t
t
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Assumption A.8 states that the effective tax on equity returns is less than the effective
tax rate on returns from fixed income:
pbps tt <
We assume that there are no future changes to tax laws.  Nor do our agents migrate
from bracket to bracket over time.  Appendix I outlines why Assumption A.8 is realistic
under U.S. tax law.  For our purposes it is sufficient to note that effective taxes on
personal equity holdings can be substantially less than those on fixed income.
We now apply tax rules to the pension plan, the corporation and the shareholder.  We
note that contributions to the plan by the corporate sponsor are deductible, within limits,
when made and investment returns inside the plan are not taxed.  We develop Results
3a, 3b and 3c as three properties of these rules.
Result 3a: A dollar inside the pension plan may be equated, at any point in
time, to )$( ct-1  in value on the balance sheet.  Equivalently, $1 on
the balance sheet may be equated to a plan asset of )/($ ct-11 .
At the time of the Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) papers, assets returned to the
corporate sponsor (“reverted” in the language of pensions) after plan termination and
settlement of all of the accrued liabilities of the plan were subject to income tax at the
corporate rate, ct .  As discussed in Section II, since 1986, the Metzenbaum excise tax
means that assets reverting to an employer from its pension plan are taxed at a much
higher rate than that which applied when contributions to the plan were made on a tax-
deductible basis.
How, then, may we develop the Black-Tepper assertion that a dollar in the plan is worth
)$( ct-1  on the corporate balance sheet?  Recall that we have assumed an ongoing
corporation and an ongoing DB plan (note that a CB plan conversion is an ongoing DB
plan).  An ongoing plan will (see Appendix D), at some future date, be required to make
                                                                                                                                           
9 Consistent with Tepper (1981) and Miller (1977)
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contributions.  We want to track the impact of a marginal dollar of contributions made at
time zero that results in reduced contributions at time n.
First we develop the converse, that )$( ct-1  on the balance sheet may be equated to $1
inside the pension plan.  This is trivial since the contribution of $1 to the plan10, results in
a contemporaneous tax reduction equal to c$t .
Next we note that, since the flow of contributions to the plan continues over time, the
existence of a marginal dollar in the plan will drive out a $1 contribution which would
have been tax deductible if made, thus adding a net )$( ct-1  to the after-tax balance
sheet.
Result 3b: A dollar contributed to a plan a time zero and used to reduce future
contributions effectively delivers a pre-tax rate of return to the
balance sheet after the payment of corporate income tax.
A corporation contributes $1 of its current earnings before income taxes [EBIT] to its
defined benefit pension plan.  Because this dollar may be deducted from the
corporation’s income subject to tax, the net after-tax balance sheet effect of the
contribution is a reduction in assets of )$( ct-1 .  Inside the plan, the $1 grows over time
to ni)$( +1 , where i  is the annually compounded untaxed rate of return on invested
assets.  After n years, the corporation reduces the contribution that it would otherwise
have made for the year by ni)$( +1 .  This increases the corporate taxes for the year by
c
ni)$( t+1  and thus )(i)$( c
n t-+ 11  is the net addition to the balance sheet.  Since the net
investment n years earlier was )$( ct-1 , the after-tax rate of growth may be seen to
equal the annual untaxed rate of return, i.
This result relies on the tax-free accumulation of assets within the pension plan and not
upon the deductibility of pension contributions.  All that is required with respect to
deductibility is that the same rules and rates apply as contributions are made at different
                                               
10 It is assumed that the $1 is within the annual deduction limits under IRC Section 404(a).
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times11.  To see that deductibility per se is unimportant, consider the result above in the
case where 0=ct .  Since 1986, result 3b has also required that assets do not
accumulate to such a degree that they may only be realized at the corporate level after
the payment of excise taxes (Appendix D).
When we combine Result 3b with the taxes that shareholders must pay on returns they
receive for investing in the company shares, we get:
Result 3c: A shareholder’s marginal investment that is contributed to the
corporate pension plan earns the market rate of return over time
and is taxed at the personal equity tax rate regardless of whether
the pension plan invests in fixed income or in equity securities.
We note that the after-tax return to )$( ct-1  of shareholder investment (which supports a
$1 contribution to the pension plan) is ))((i)$( cps
n tt --+ 111  and that the tax rates are
independent of the nature of the asset allocation within the pension plan12.
Shareholder optimal policy
Define:
=r the riskless return on the one-year T-bill
=
~
q the one-year stochastic rate of return on equity investment
=
_
q the one-year expected rate of return on equity investment
=a the fraction of assets invested in indexed equities, balance in T-bill
=b the fraction of liabilities benchmarked to equities, balance to T-bill
=-+= )r(qe aa 1
~~
one-year stochastic rate of return on an a-weighted portfolio
=-+= r(qae
__
)1 a one-year expected rate of return on an a-weighted portfolio
                                               
11 Tepper analyzes the case where contributions may be made in excess of IRC deductibility
limits and the resulting deductions must be deferred.  We do not address this case.
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We consider investment/crediting pairs designated as }{ ba, , where each variable is
restricted to the range ],[ 10 13, and ask whether there exists a shareholder optimal pair.
Note that these pairs admit no offsets from the marketed benchmarks and thus, absent
tax considerations, shareholders should be indifferent among them.  Recall that we have
assumed that employee compensation and satisfaction will not vary with the definition of
the liability benchmark and that we explore variations to this assumption at the end of
this section.  Thus all demonstrable differences in shareholder wealth attributable to the
cases above must derive from the tax treatment that attaches to each pair.
Result 4: Shareholders gain as a  is decreased and as b  is increased.  With
each variable restricted to the range ],[ 10 , the optimal
investment/crediting pair is },{ 10 == ba  , i.e., the plan invests
entirely in T-bills and credits equity returns on employee
account balances!
Following Tepper, we assume that shareholders offset pension allocation decisions in
their personal portfolios after adjusting for corporate taxes by multiplying by )-( ct1 .  So,
for example, a $1 increase in pension equities which is accompanied by a $1 decrease
in pension T-bills will be offset by personal portfolio transactions aggregated for all
shareholders:  sales of )$( ct-1  of equities and purchases of the same amount of T-bills.
The shareholder personal transactions restore all cash flows to shareholders prior to the
payment of taxes on personal portfolio income.  Thus we can measure the effectiveness
of any pension asset or liability allocation by looking to the taxes paid after the
shareholder offset transactions are effected.
                                                                                                                                           
12 We keep as our consistent measure $1 of pension assets or )-$( ct1  of corporate assets.
Tepper (1981) is inconsistent in this regard as will become clear in our results reconciliation.
13 This range is arbitrary but convenient.  We can certainly design crediting and investing
strategies that would extend outside these boundaries.  The linearity of the arbitrage results
makes the implications obvious.  At some point, within or without this range, the linearity must
fail as we exhaust the opportunity for tax gains or as the asset-liability mismatch raises the
probability of cash flow crises and bankruptcy above a negligible level.
Jeremy Gold The Shareholder Optimal Design December 28, 2000
of Cash Balance Plans
24
In order to normalize our analysis, we begin with all assets and liabilities in T-bills
},{ 00 == ba  which we identify as the base pair.  Because Tepper and Black assumed
that all liabilities could be represented by fixed income securities )(i.e., 0=b  and
concluded that all plan assets should be invested in fixed income )( 0=a , our base pair
matches their preferred choice.
In this base case, shareholders will pay taxes at their personal stock tax rate, pst , based
on the net income of the pension plan diminished by the corporate tax:
Pcps )rE-( tt 1 . (1)
Suppose that the pension plan is now allocated as }{ ba, .  Shareholders act to offset this
allocation by selling )LA)($( PPc bat --1  of equities and purchasing the same amount of
T-bills.  They pay taxes on their income generated by the pension plan:
]rE)L-A-r)(q)[(-( PPPcps +batt
~
1
and they pay additional taxes on the offsetting personal transactions:
)q-)(rL-A)(-( pspbPPc ttbat
~
1
a total of:
)L-A)r(-)(-()rE-( PPcpspbPcps battttt 11 + (2)
where the first term of (2) may be recognized as the base case (1) and so the second
term represents the incremental taxes associated with the change in pension allocation.
Since we have 0>- pspb tt , taxes increase with a  and decrease with b .  Without
leverage, taxes are minimized with },{ 10 == ba  which means that our shareholder
optimal pension investment is 100% in T-bills with the liability crediting rate
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benchmarked 100% to an equity portfolio.  The maximum tax case is presented by
},{ 01 == ba .  The typical corporate plan today may be identified as }{ 0, =ba  which
constitutes an inferior strategy for shareholders which becomes progressively worse with
increasing a .  Note that the base case },{ 00 == ba  is superior to the typical plan, as is
shown by both Tepper and Black.  A locus of cases equivalent to the base case is traced
out by strategies that follow },
A
L
{
P
P bba = .  These are also the cases where the pension
plan’s effect on corporate earnings is most certain.
Reconciliation with Tepper
The Tepper paper assumes 0=b  at all times.  Thus we need to reconcile his Table 1 to
the after-tax shareholder values that we develop with the same assumption.  In addition,
we restate the incremental part of (2) in the perpetuity form favored by Tepper and Miller
by dividing by the after-tax riskless rate of return, )-r( pbt1 :
pb
Pcpspb
-
)A)(-)(-
t
attt
1
1(
Since we are considering an asset allocation change without any change in plan funding,
our treatment may be compared to the difference between the top and bottom rows of
Tepper’s Table 1.  This amount is the same regardless of financing and is shown in box
(3) of Table 1.  We recognize that PAa  when 1=a  is the same as what Tepper defines
as F .  When 0=a , this goes to zero.  Because this equation measures incremental
taxes, the perpetuity value received by the shareholder when the plan switches from
equity assets to debt assets is:
pb
cpspb
-
)F-)(-(
t
ttt
1
1
(3)
which differs from Tepper’s quadrant (3) by a factor of )-( ct1 .  We have developed our
equations based on the dollar amount of pension assets and liabilities and have tracked
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them through to the shareholder.  Thus, we contend 
pb
cpspb
-
)-)(-
t
ttt
1
1(
 represents the
shareholder gain from switching one pension dollar from equity to debt.  Recall that a
pension dollar must be multiplied by )-( ct1  to determine its equivalent balance sheet
value.
Tepper defines SF  and DF , and implicitly F  as well, as dollars of pension fund
investment but he uses them as though they were the balance sheet equivalent.  Thus to
reconcile to Tepper, we must start with his gain equation and modify it accordingly:
)}-(F)---L)()-r(F-)(-)-rL(-)(F{(rF
)-r(
Gain psSpbDpscpsSD
pb
trttttr
t
11111
1
1
+=
where we have replaced an ""e  with the equivalent ""r .  This allows cancellation and a
simpler restatement:
)}--L)()-r(F-)(-)-rL(-({rF
)-r(
Gain pbDpscpsD
pb
tttt
t
1111
1
1
=
Next we multiply DF  by )-( ct1  as indicated above so that we may properly deem DF  to be
pension assets rather than their balance sheet equivalent:
)}-)-L)(-()-r(F-)(-)-rL(-)(-({rF
)-r(
Gain pbcDpsccpsD
pb
tttttt
t
111111
1
1
=
and rearrange terms:
))}-)-(-)(-)-L((-)(-({F
)-(
Gain pbpscpspbcD
pb
tttttt
t
1111
1
1
=
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By letting FFD =  and 0=L , we get our (3).  Next we consider that the borrowing, L ,
necessary to support a pension investment of F , need only be equal to )-F( ct1  and so
we set L  to that value and we let FFD =  again to derive:
)-(
)-F()-(
Gain
pb
pscc
t
ttt
1
11
=
which differs from Tepper’s quadrant (1) by the same )-( ct1  that we used to adjust
quadrant (3).  Lastly, with the same value for L  and letting 0=DF :
)
)-(
)-)(-
-)F(-(Gain
pb
psc
c t
tt
t
1
11
11
(
=
we get our modifcation of Tepper’s quadrant (2).  This may be compared to Miller’s
equation for “the gain from leverage, LG , for the shareholders in a firm…”
14:
L
pb
psc
L )B)-(
)-)(-(
-(G
t
tt
1
11
1=
where LB  is the amount of corporate borrowing.  If LB  is the amount of borrowing
necessary to support F , it must be that )F-(B cL t1= .
The Black variation
Fischer Black (1980) developed a strategy where the tax benefits of investing pension
assets entirely in bonds arise at the corporate balance sheet level.  This version would
seem to provide greater incentive to corporate managers than does the Tepper
approach which relies on shareholder action.  As we show below, the basic Black
approach (he offers more than one) may rely on shareholder action as well.
Black proposes that a corporation:
                                               
14 Miller (1977), pp. 267.
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· Sell all stock held by its defined benefit pension plans.
· Invest the plan assets entirely in taxable fixed income securities.
· Borrow, on the corporate balance sheet, )- ct1(  times the amount transacted in the
pension plan.
· Use the borrowed funds to repurchase the corporation’s own stock.
Black argues from the augmented balance sheet perspective of Treynor (i.e., he
assumes transparency and ignores some ERISA technicalities and existing bond
covenants) that lenders should be willing to provide the funds after they recognize that
these transactions are leverage-neutral.  As we do here, he considers well-funded
pension plans15 maintained by corporate sponsors where bankruptcy is deemed to have
a very low probability.
Black parses the four transactions as two pairs:
· Sale of pension plan stock holdings and purchase of )- ct1(  as much of the
corporation’s own stock.
· Borrowing of )-$( ct1  on the balance sheet to support each $1 of bond purchases
(equal to stock sales) inside the pension plan.
As we do, he equates $1 in the plan with )-$( ct1  on the balance sheet and makes the
necessary supporting assumptions, some explicitly, others implicitly.  The stock
transactions above have no tax implications since neither pension plan transactions nor
the corporate transactions in company stock are taxable.  The entire tax effect is thus
derived from borrowing at the after-tax rate )r-( ct1  while earning the pre-tax rate r .  The
after-tax annual gain is Pcc )rA-( tt 1  with a perpetuity value of PcAt .  Black comments
that, with a 50% combined federal-state value for ct , this is equivalent to borrowing
Pc)A-( t1  in perpetuity without ever paying interest or principal.  This is comparable to the
results in our numerical example in Section V.
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Black observes that the sale of diversified equities by the plan accompanied by the
repurchase of company stock does not constitute a perfect hedge.  He says that the
company is now more idiosyncratic, which should not be a problem in diversified
shareholder portfolios, and he asks “would many investors pay five16 percent per year for
the sake of added diversification within their holdings of a single firm’s stock?”
He suggests an alternative approach which provides a better hedge at a small tax cost.
Instead of repurchasing one’s own stock, he proposes that the proceeds of the corporate
borrowing be invested in diversified balance-sheet equity implemented via a mutual fund
designed to convert capital gains to dividends17.
Stock diversification within a single firm
We look at a model of the basic Black proposal in order to examine the stock
diversification issue more closely.  As we did with the Tepper model, we will look first at
the transaction without regard to taxes.  For ease of exposition, we will not look directly
at the “undiversification” that arises when a company sells diversified stocks and buys its
own.  Instead, we will assume a starting place where no company owns shares of
another and consider what occurs when a company issues its own stock in order to
purchase shares of others.
Because we are looking at the narrow issue of stock diversification only, we will assume,
without loss of generality, that the assets of corporations are financed exclusively with
equity:
B,iiP,iB,ii AAEEE ==+=
0=+= P,iB,ii LLL
                                                                                                                                           
15 Thus the Sharpe (1976) PBGC pension put is not considered.  See Appendix D
16 Computed as rct  in an era where the riskless rate might be ten percent and the combined
federal-state tax rate might be fifty percent.
17 In a tax regime where 85% of dividends received by a corporation from other corporations
was tax exempt.  Today this rate is 70% (IRC Section 243).  Corporate capital gains are
taxed at the ct  rate.
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where the subscript i  added to the earlier notation for the augmented balance sheet,
identifies the thi  firm of n such firms ,n)(i 1= .  iE  is the equity issued by company i
which may also be labeled “market capitalization” and iA  are the business assets of firm
i  which may alternatively be identified as the “value of the firm.”  Since we begin with no
pension plan assets, we can equate the market capitalization and the ex-pension value
of the firm.  We normalize by assuming that each company issues one share of iE  at a
per share value equal to the value of the firm, iA .  The equality of iA  and iE  may seem
redundant at the moment but we intend that iA  will not change as new shares of iE  are
issued to finance pension investments in the equity shares of other firms, jE .
Before any company buys the stock of another, public investors rationally create
preferred portfolios of equities by weighting their investments in each of the companies.
An example of such a procedure is embodied in the capital asset pricing model (CAPM)
where asset weightings based on a covariance matrix minimize portfolio risk for a given
level of portfolio expected return.  We rely on less restrictive investor rationality18:  we do
not posit any optimization scheme, merely requiring that, given a single set of portfolio
choices, the investor always makes the same selection.  The essence of the selection
process is that investors compute preferred weights for their exposure to the
components of the 1n x  firm value vector:
}{AA i=
With m  shareholders indexed by k  ,m)(k 1= , we define a matrix of weights, }{gG k,i=
where each k,ig  is a fraction that is applied to the business assets, iA , of company i  to
compute k ’s holding.  The aggregate investor wealth equals the aggregate market
portfolio:
AiAG Tn=
where ni  signifies an 1n x  vector of ones.  Naturally each column of G  sums to unity.
                                               
18 Stiglitz (1974), pp. 860.
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Next we suppose, still without tax concerns, that the pension plan of each company
acquires stock in other companies.  The sponsor company finances the purchase by
issuing more of its own equity.  While this might be done by exchanges among the firms
alone, we will assume that additional shares are issued to public investors who finance
their purchases by selling some of their own diversified portfolios to the issuer.  We look
at the case where company i  issues its own shares in an amount sufficient to purchase
a fraction, i,jf , of the share jE  of company j .  After this exchange, the number of issued
and outstanding shares (and the market capitalization) of the diversifying company will
have increased:
ji,jii
i
ji,j
i EfA)AA
Ef
(E +=+= 1 (4)
where the parenthetic expression represents the number of outstanding shares for
company i .  Noting that, for company i , all of its shares are held by the public, we also
define:
i
*
i EE =
as the portion of the market capitalization of company i  held by the public (i.e., not
cross-owned by the other corporations).  Using this notation for company j  as well, but
observing that the public no longer holds all of its outstanding shares, we see:
ji,jji,j
*
j )A-f()E-f(E 11 ==
and
ji
*
j
*
i AAEE +=+
Letting:
}{EE
}{EE
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*
i
*
=
=
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Jeremy Gold The Shareholder Optimal Design December 28, 2000
of Cash Balance Plans
32
apply generally as companies’ pension plans buy, but do not sell short, each other’s
shares.  Thus we see that, although the business asset base has not expanded, the total
market capitalization seems to have increased through cross-ownership.  But the
“market portfolio”, which consists only of those shares held by public investors, still
owns, in the aggregate, exactly all the assets that we have designated as A .
There is no reason to conclude that, after these issuer-initiated transactions, each
investor will be left holding the same weightings of A  as he did before, but it must be the
case that the preferred portfolio for each investor may still be computed using the
original weights on each iA .  It is also the case that the investor will be able to weight
(long and short) positions in the shares contained in *E  in order to replicate his preferred
holdings of A  (and that the value of each investor’s portfolio will be as before).  The
details of this replication are shown in Appendix F.
What then has happened?  Each of the original companies has now become a
diversified mutual fund (and, if they have substantially diversified, the CAPM beta for
each company will have moved from its original value to a value closer to one).  There is
no change in the equilibrium exposure to real assets among shareholders.  What this
tells us is that, absent tax considerations, companies that wish to diversify across the
market may do so by purchasing each others’ stock without cost to the system19.  What
both Black and Tepper tell us is that, when taxes are taken into account, companies
stand to gain or lose as they diversify depending on how they do so20.  More specifically,
they show that holding equity within tax-sheltered defined benefit pension plans is costly.
We have just seen that, with our assumptions, a company should not be concerned that
it does not internally diversify since shareholders will be able to achieve their own
diversification.  This means, however, that the Black variation, like the Tepper, relies on
shareholder actions.  The distinction between the two, therefore, is not in the need for
shareholders to react, but rather in the location of the tax benefits.  Tepper captures
                                               
19 Our use of the no taxes, no bankruptcy assumptions is necessary to support this statement.
20 One can hypothesize a comprehensive equilibrium, inclusive of a government which must
collect an immutable amount of corporate taxes, in which internal diversification would
produce no gains or losses.
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them in shareholder personal accounts because the equity/fixed reallocation occurs in
both the pension plan and shareholder portfolios. Black captures them at the corporate
level because shareholders need only realign their equity holdings while the corporate
equity/fixed reallocation occurs both on the balance sheet and within the pension plan.
Black in a cash balance plan
As noted above, the sale of diversified stocks by the plan and the repurchase of
company stock is not a hedge.  Under a cash balance plan, as with any other defined
benefit plan, the sponsor who wishes to sell pension equities and buy its own stock will
not be hedging (we have seen, however, that shareholders can correct this on their
own).  But our cash balance proposal goes one step further and calls for the promise of
equity returns to participant accounts and the repurchase of additional company stock.
This suggests an approach to plan design that has not yet been tried: a company may
choose to credit the total return on its own stock to employee plan balances212223.  This
approach would, with respect to the liability side of the plan, constitute an exact hedge at
the company level after allowance for corporate taxes (multiplying plan shares by )-( ct1
to compute balance sheet repurchases).  In the tradition of new designs in the employee
                                               
21 This raises a number of ERISA issues.  Employee benefits that are dependent on employer
stock performance usually are qualified as Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs).
Some non-ESOP defined contribution plans provide that some of the assets will be invested
in the sponsor’s stock and thus employee accounts are dependent on the employer stock
performance.  Defined benefit plans are generally restricted to investing no more than 10% of
their assets in the stock of the plan’s sponsor.  While even the settled ERISA issues are well
beyond the scope of this paper, this approach raises ERISA issues that have never before
been addressed.
22 The similarity to the actual issuance of company shares will undoubtedly raise issues under
the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
23 While plan sponsor’s have often encouraged employee ownership of company stock with and
without the use of qualified retirement plans, companies have never “shorted” their own stock
in any such program (they have, however, often used shares repurchased or held as treasury
shares for that purpose).  The idea that shorting the sponsor’s stock inside a defined
contribution plan might reduce the risk that employees face because their earnings and their
savings were highly correlated has always surrendered to the motivational advantages
claimed for increasing that risk.  Additionally, the public relations implications of a company or
its employees shorting its stock has always resulted in an automatic declination of such
ideas.  In this instance, of course, the company would be shorting its stock to its employees
(thus putting them in the same position as shareholders) who, as before would be long the
stock and face the correlated risk thus implied.  Lastly, it would seem that the “shares”
implicitly “sold to participants” using this approach should result in an accounting dilution.
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benefit arena, such a plan might naturally be dubbed a CBSOP, thus highlighting its
ESOP-like features.
Upsetting the equilibrium
We look again at the Black and Tepper proposals and ask whether, with tax
considerations but without governmental reaction, the undiversification can occur without
upsetting the market equilibrium.  Note the )-( ct1  factor in each of the transaction pairs
proposed by each writer.  Because of this factor, we see that the transactions increase
the demand for fixed income securities and reduce demand for equities.  Although we
have insufficient information to determine the magnitude of the resulting price changes,
the direction is clear.  If every DB sponsor followed Black or Tepper, equity prices in
general would decline and so too would corporate borrowing rates.  We can anticipate
that corporations would borrow more and issue less equity but that the new equilibrium
would still be characterized by lower values for r  and higher values for 
_
q .
Viewed from an earlier starting point, we may conclude that investment in equities by
corporate pension plans has provided, ceteris paribus, equity investors with too large a
premium to date and, if Black or Tepper were followed forward, a lower future premium.
Reconciling Black and Tepper
Black’s after-tax gain on the balance sheet is:
cc)-r( tt1
annually per $1 of pension assets reallocated from stocks to bonds.  This is equivalent to
a shareholder after-tax gain of:
)-()-r( pscc ttt 11
Tepper’s shareholder after-tax gain:
)-)(-r( pspbc ttt1 (5)
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The Tepper gain less the Black gain:
)]-()--)[(-r( pscpspbc ttttt 11
Which equals zero when:
)-( ) -( pscpspb tttt 1=
)-()-)-(-( pscpbps tttt 111 =
)-()-)(-( pbpsc ttt 111 =
which is Miller’s formulation for leverage-indifferent tax rates.  When the LHS,
representing the shareholder cost of corporate borrowing is less than the RHS,
representing the cost of shareholder personal borrowing, there is an advantage to
borrowing at the corporate rather than at the personal level.  When there is an
advantage to borrowing at the corporate level, the Black gain exceeds the Tepper gain
and vice versa.  This makes sense because the Black proposal borrows on the
corporate balance sheet while the Tepper version relies on personal borrowing (investor
sales of fixed income securities).
Result 5a: Absent gains from leverage, the gains from tax arbitrage using the
Black and Tepper approaches are identical.
Because not all shareholders actually have the same marginal tax rates, some
shareholders may prefer the approach of Black and others prefer that of Tepper.  An
important special case arises for tax-exempt institutions (including, perhaps misguidedly,
pension plans).  In this case:
Result 5b: When the shareholder is tax exempt, 0== pbps tt , and
RHS LHSc <>" 0t  and the Black proposal is preferable.
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Black and Tepper gains merely offset losses
The common strategy for both CB and DB plans consists of a fixed income promise
combined with an investment strategy that includes equities.  Black and Tepper describe
their proposals to invest the pension fund entirely in fixed income securities as a “gain”.
Certainly it represents a comparative gain vis-a-vis common practice, but we prefer to
describe it as a recovery of losses created by an ill-advised equity investment strategy.
We do not make this characterization arbitrarily.  It may be developed by an ab ovo look
at the exchange of ordinary compensation for a pension benefit of any sort (DC, DB or
CB).  Suppose a company creates a DC plan and contributes a percentage of each
employee’s pay in lieu of an equal amount of compensation.  Such a plan would
preserve total compensation cost for the company on both pre- and post-tax bases.  The
employees, however, might benefit from the tax deferral.  To the extent that they have
alternative tax-advantaged savings (e.g., pre-tax IRAs) available, they should not be
expected to accept a reduction in total compensation.  To the extent, if any, that the
pension plan extends their tax advantages or that they value professional asset
management and administrative convenience, total compensation may be reduced.
Without denying this possibility, for our analytic purposes, we will assume that total
compensation is unaffected by the plan creation.
Thus with a DC or our DC/CB clone arrangement (defined in Appendix A), the tax
advantages inure to the benefit of the employees.  In the case of a DB plan with
contributions equal to annual increases in the value of accrued benefits, and with fixed
income investments matching any benefits promised, we are in the same position as in
the DC and DC/CB plans.  If the corporation subsequently decides to sell the fixed
income assets and to buy equities, as so many DB plan sponsors did during the period
when trusteed plans replaced insured plans, needless taxes are thereafter inflicted on
shareholders with no effect on employees.  A shorthand synopsis of this is:
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Result 6: Our base case, },{ 00 , is identical to the Tepper and Black proposals
is identical to cash compensation24.
Viewed from this perspective, it is clear that the first opportunity for substantial
shareholder gains from pension tax arbitrage arises with the advent of the cash balance
plan and the concomitant power to set the value of b  to a value greater than zero.
V Implications
The obvious first implication is that companies should invest all defined benefit pension
plan assets in taxable fixed income, as observed by both Tepper and Black.  Further,
with a cash balance plan, shareholders should desire an equity benchmark for the plan’s
investment crediting rate.  The first subsection below presents a numerical example of
the value of such decisions.  Then, because the Tepper and Black proposals are
essentially one period, and because, with the extension into the CB arena, the choice of
plan design affects the evolution of the tax gain opportunity, we look at some plan
dynamics.  These effects, which derive from mismatches between plan assets and
liabilities, are then generalized and represented with a graphical assist.  In the last
subsection, because the assumption of employee indifference in A.11 is narrow, we look
at employee preferences and at a plan structure that includes employee choices with
respect to the investment crediting rate.
A numerical example
With the top personal federal tax rate now equal to 39.6% and the corresponding
corporate rate equal to 35%, we can use the following assumptions (Appendix I) to
develop a numerical example of the value of shareholder optimal design of a CB plan:
4.pb =t
35.c =t
15.ps =t
                                               
24 Except for the value, if any, reflected off of employee utility gains and further excepted for the
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We add the assumption that 6.=a , the “classic” 60:40 asset allocation for DB plans.
Using the second term of equation (2) we can compute taxes in excess of those on the
base case:
PP % of rA.)A)r(.-.)(-.(. 7596351154 =
This may be compared to the shareholder optimal allocation },{ 10 == ba  and resulting
tax where the minus sign indicates a deduction from the base case:
PP % of rL.-))r(-L-.)(-.(. 2516351154 =
If, by chance, the assets of the plan equal the liabilities (total account balances), the loss
of potential value to the shareholders is 26% of the riskless return on the plan.  In the
perpetuity form of Miller and Tepper, the value of such additional annual returns is:
P
pb
P A.
)-r(
rA.
4333
1
26
=
t
So that the shareholders of a corporation with a $1 billion CB plan crediting the T-bill rate
will give up $433 million of after-tax present value.  Consider the common case where
the plan credits 1% over the T-bill rate.  This adds:
P
P
pb
Ppsc )L
r
.
(
)r(.
)L(..
)-r(
)L)(.-)(-( 00921
6
015525
1
0111
==
t
tt
to the shareholder loss.  With the riskless rate less than 5%, this exceeds $184 million.
This total after-tax loss of $617 million may be compared to a hypothetical case in which
the plan liabilities are instantly and miraculously erased and where the plan assets are
then returned to the corporation without being subjected to the enormous post-1990
excise tax25 on plan reversions without replacement plans.  In such a most-
                                                                                                                                           
gains (losses) attributable to the tax shelter applied to positive (negative) pension equity Ep.
25 50% in addition to the ordinary income tax rate of 35%, IRC Section 4980.
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extraordinarily-favorable case the corporation would pay $350 million in taxes leaving
$650 million.  Even if shareholders were taxed at only the 15% rate developed above
(for a presumably longer holding period), the net proceeds would then be $552.5 million.
In effect, the misdesign and misinvestment of the CB plan is more costly than the
instantaneous destruction of the entire $1 billion of plan assets!
Some dynamic considerations
With our assumptions, the tax gains from setting },{ ba  optimally and making the
offsetting adjustments are developed one year at a time with certainty at the balance
sheet or shareholder level.  Using the Tepper approach, the one year certain gain is
given by:
))L-(A)r(-)(-( PPcpspb 00 11 battt +
adapted from equation (2).  },{ 00 ba  represent the investment allocation parameters
before they are set to },{ 10 .  This gain is increasing in both PA  and PL  which simply
verifies that, for a suboptimally managed plan, there are gain opportunities on both sides
of the pension balance sheet.  It also implies that, ceteris paribus, larger gains are
possible with larger plans.  Observe that PL  is the primary driver in this since all
actuarial processes impel PA  to pursue PL  asymptotically.
We have thoroughly explored the tax gain opportunities for a single period where we
know the values of PA  and PL .  In the Tepper paper, the one-year case may be
extended to a perpetuity because the liabilities grow with the population (which he
implicitly assumes to be stationary) and with the risk free rate.  In the CB case, the
liabilities may grow more rapidly and thus we ask, what can we say about the progress
of PA  and PL  over time?
We want to look at five plan events that impact the future values of PA  and PL  and sign
the shareholder effects for these events for three allocation cases:  1) },{ 10 , 2) },{ 01  and
3) },{ 00 .  We know that the exchange of pension benefits for cash compensation,
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ignoring secondary benefits for shareholders reflected off the employees, is profitable to
shareholders in case 1, unprofitable in case 2 and a wash in case 3.  The five events
are:  i) new compensation credits (sans funding), ii) funding, iii) retiree and teminee
withdrawals, iv) investment growth in assets and v) investment growth in liabilities.
· New compensation credits (unaccompanied by funding) – imply an increase in next
year’s pL  and lead to a loss in case 2 and 3 and a wash in case 1.  In cases 2 and 3,
the company has retained the unpaid compensation on its balance sheet in
exchange for pension promises (account balance increments) to employees,
effectively a borrowing.  But it is tax-inefficient to borrow inside the plan where the
pre-tax cost of such debt will be delivered to the balance sheet on an after-tax basis.
If equity is the liability benchmark, as in case 1, the corporation (Black) or the
shareholders (Black and Tepper) will react to effect a no-risk tax wash.
· Funding leads to a gain in cases 1 and 3 and to a wash in case 2.  In cases 1 and 3,
cash is removed from the corporate balance sheet and invested in taxable fixed-
income assets inside the plan.  The adjustment is on-balance-sheet borrowing
(Black) and the result is after-tax borrowing supporting pre-tax rates of return.  In
case 2, the offset is sales of shares such that the pre-tax return on equity is offset by
a matched pre-tax cost of equity capital.  This finding is consistent with assertions by
both Black and Tepper that funding is gainful only if invested in taxable fixed-income
assets.
We find it natural to combine new compensation credits and funding and to go one step
further and define contemporaneous funding to be the exact amount of new
(presumed to be currently and algebraically deductible – i.e., taxable without excise tax if
negative) corporate contributions necessary to result in:
p,tp,t r)E(E +=+ 11
which might equivalently be defined as funding equal to the new compensation credits
plus (minus) the investment credits in excess of the risk free rate minus (plus) the
excess investment returns on assets:
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p,tAp,tLp,tLp,t -r)A-(i-r)L(i)Li-(L +++ 11
p,tAp,tp,t -r)A-(ir)L-(L += + 11
p,tp,tAp,tp,t rEA-i-LL += +1
p,tAp,t )Ai-(A += + 11
where Ai  and Li  each take on the value 
~
q  or r  depending on the plan strategy.  The
first line above shows that all excess returns on assets and liabilities are immediately
recognized in the funding calculation26.  The last line shows that returns on assets fully
reduce the amount of funding.
The combination of these first two events is just like the existence of the plan itself.  That
is, the net result is added future gain in case 1, added future loss in case 2 and a wash
in case 3.
· Retirements and withdrawals cause equal reductions in PA  and PL  and thus reduce
future tax gains or losses depending on the case.  The impact is the opposite of the
effect that arises from new compensation credits that are contemporanously funded
without regard to investment credits and investment returns.
· Investment growth in assets has no impact on the tax gain for the concurrent period
because we have assumed full hedging.  For the same reason, it creates no
economic gain or loss to shareholders other than that identified herein as the tax
gain.  For a given level of PL , an asset-side investment gain has the same affect as
an equivalent amount of contemporaneous funding.  But for such a given PL  it
replaces an equivalent amount of funding and, to avoid double counting, we must
recognize this entire event as a wash.
                                               
26 This follows neither actuarial nor accounting practice, but is consistent with the economic
logic applied throughout this paper.
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For example, consider case 2, },{ 10 , and assume that assets earn p
~
 - r)Aq(k =
more than the risk free rate.  Because of full hedging and because the assets have
exceeded the risk free return by k , we must have )-k( ct1  less in resources outside
the plan.  But this is exactly reversed by contemporaneous funding (other than the
concurrent tax effect, which remains external to the plan).
· Investment growth in liabilities has an effect that is very similar to the granting of
additional compensation credits which is to say that it leads to a loss in cases 2 and
3 and to a wash in case 1.  Unlike compensation credits, however, it is not costly to
the firm because of the assumed hedge.  Further, because it compels funding, the
effect of an excess liability return is to increase the subsequent tax gain opportunity.
Looking at the last two events ensemble, in case 3, nothing happens.  Although the
assets and liabilities are larger or smaller depending on the direction of investment
returns, the design strategy forces future gains and losses to be unaffected (except for
the risk free return on PE  which itself is merely compounding at the risk free rate with no
adjustment for the swelling or contracting plan size).  If, we are operating in case 1 or 2,
however, we find that when asset returns exceed liability returns, we lose less (case 2)
or gain less (case 1) in subsequent periods.  When liability returns exceed asset returns,
we lose more (case 2) or gain more (case 1) thereafter.
Result 7a: The tax loss strategy },{ 01  gets worse when liabilities grow faster
than assets but the expected case is that assets will grow faster
than liabilities and thus some of the damage is expected to be self-
mitigating.
Result 7b: The tax gain strategy },{ 10  gets better when liabilities grow faster
than assets and, since this is the expected case, the gains are
likely to be self-enhancing.
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A general and graphical look at strategy
Figure 1 provides a graphical view of some of the issues discussed in the previous
subsection.  The origin represents the base case, },{ 00 , and the most prominent line
represents the locus of points with the same tax and hedging implications as the base
case.  It is given by }
L
A
,{
P
Paa  with axes defined by },{ ba .  The line will pass through the
point },{ 11  iff PP LA = .  A plan with assets greater than 100% of the account balances
will cause the line to intersect the top of the chart space, while assets less than 100%
imply an intersection with the right hand space border.  The example presented has
assets equal to 125% of liabilities.
The lines parallel to the base case locus represent equivalence classes for taxes and
hedging implications.  The “Plus 10%” case contains all points where %
L
A
-
P
P 10=ab
which is a tax gain strategy.  The “Minus” cases represent tax loss strategies.  This
allows us to observe that all favorable strategies are found to the upper left with the
unfavorable strategies to the lower right.
Along the base case line PE  grows at the riskless rate (assuming new compensation
credits are contemporaneously funded) and the tax situation in the following year will be
no different from the current year regardless of the performance of equities relative to
the riskless rate.  All other strategies create uncertainty with respect to the potential tax
situation in the following year and the uncertainty is proportional to the displacement
relative to the base case.  Thus all strategies in an equivalence class (e.g., all those on
the “Plus 10%” line) will lead to the same increase or decrease in the tax potential for the
following year.  When equity provides a positive excess return, “plus” strategies become
more “plus” while “minus” strategies become less minus.  This extends Result 7a to all
minus strategies and Result 7b to all plus strategies.  The opposite occurs when the
excess return on equities is negative.
This suggests that the sponsor of any CB plan (unless substantially overfunded or
underfunded as discussed in Appendix D) that is presently in the lower right should alter
the plan to move to the left and upward at least as far as it takes to locate along the base
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case line (i.e., Black-Tepper is generally a winning strategy compared to most DB
plans).  Plans that are on or above the base case will provide greater tax gains to
shareholders if they are moved further upwards and leftwards but the sponsors will have
to consider the likelihood that they will encounter some of the Appendix D concerns.
Employee choice plans – contract improvement
The model presented so far treats employee compensation exogenously, assuming that
the equity fraction of the liability crediting rate, b , is inconsequential to the determination
of other compensation.  In this subsection we examine the role that b  might play in the
employment contract.
We describe a new b  as "contract-improving" if shareholders and/or employees gain
without loss to the other group.  This will be achieved at the expense of taxpayers in
general.  Because employee preferences may depend on individual access to
investment resources, degree of risk aversion, tax bracket and anticipated period of
deferral, we consider the determination of ib  by employee i  in the context of a plan that
permits individual choice.  Because taxable shareholders gain and employees lose with
increasing ib , our starting place for potential improvements is the 0=ib  plan.
We will generally find a rational opportunity for contract improvement when the
shareholder gain exceeds the employee loss for some employees.  When employees
are heterogeneous, it may be optimal for shareholders to chose a level of incentive that
will motivate only a subset of the motivatable employees.
After considering rational opportunities, we will look at the experience in employee-
choice 401k plans and suggest some practical ways for employers to use employee
choice for the benefit of shareholders.
Rational opportunities
There are two possible sources of contract improvement that we will rule out because
each would allow arbitrage opportunities unrelated to the selection of b .  The first of
these would entail the exchange of taxable wages for qualified plan benefits.  It always
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seems that tax gains may be generated by salary reduction and benefit increases.  But it
is clear that this process is limited in at least two ways:  i) tax code provisions and ii)
utility costs that are unspecified in our model; many employees simply do not want more
than a limited exchange of future tax benefits for loss of current income.  We will
assume, therefore, that no further compensation reductions will be part of any contract
improvement that we identify.
A second source is a violation of the Miller indifference condition.  If the equation does
not apply, then we might seem to generate shareholder benefits by altering the
corporate capital structure.  We have seen (Appendix I) that the indifference equation
does not hold exactly.  But, as with the salary reduction case above, we may view this as
indicative of costs that are not specified in our model.  Therefore, we assume that the
Miller condition applies.  This further implies that we can proceed using the Tepper
approach, knowing that results would be identical under Black.
Employees may elect 0>ib  because they do not have the resources to acquire equity
investments outside the plan.  We will explore this further below, but in a temporary
effort to narrow the opportunities for contract improvement, we will assume that
employees can borrow and lend at the risk-free rate in amounts sufficient to acquire all
the equity they desire outside of the plan.
We have now narrowed the opportunities for contract improvement to those that derive
from the differential tax positions of employees and shareholders.  We define the
following tax rates as they apply to employees:
income pension on ratetax  i employee
stocks on ratetax  i employee
bonds on ratetax  i employee
=
=
=
iep
ies
ieb
,
,
,
t
t
t
The first two rates are analogous to the corresponding definitions for shareholders and
might, in fact, be identical to the shareholder rates.  The third rate is a decreasing
function of the remaining time that pension earnings are to be deferred.  If pension
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earnings this year will be paid out n  years hence, then, assuming no bracket migration
by i  and a constant riskless return r :
n
ieb
ieb
n
iep
))r((
)(r)(
,
,
,
11
11
1
t
t
t
-+
-+
-=
If pension earnings are to be paid out to the employee within the current tax year, then
0=n  and iebiep ,, tt = .  As n  increases, iep,t  decreases and may become negative.  A
negative value implies that $1 of earnings on pension assets in the current period is
worth more than $1 of after-tax funds currently in the hands of the employee.  Selected
values of iep,t  as a function of ieb,t  and n  are shown with %5=r  and %10=r :
%5=r %10=r
ieb,t ieb,t
40% 28% 15% 40% 28% 15%
n iep,t iep,t
0 40% 28% 15% 40% 28% 15%
5 34 23 12 28 18 9
10 27 18 9 13 7 2
15 20 12 5 -5 -6 -4
20 12 6 2 -26 -21 -12
25 3 -1 -2 -51 -37 -20
30 -7 -8 -5 -82 -56 -28
We have already determined that the shareholder annual gain from the shift of $1 of
pension liability from fixed income to equity is given by equation (5):
)-)(-r( pspbc ttt1
The corresponding loss to the employee is given by:
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Shareholders will be able to provide incentives for employee elections of 0>ib  when:
)-(
)-(
)-(
)-)(( eseb
es
ep
pspbc ttt
t
ttt
1
1
1 >-
If shareholders are generally in high brackets (e.g., %15%,40 == pspb tt  ), the above
condition will be met for all employees who are in the lowest bracket (i.e.,
%10%,15 »= eseb tt  ).  For those in the middle (e.g., %13%,28 »= eseb tt  ), because
)-()-( esep tt 1/1  is greater than )( ct-1  for all employees with sufficiently long time
horizons27, the opportunity will only exist for pension income that will be deferred for a
relatively short time.  For employees with the same tax status as the shareholders, no
opportunity for rational tax-based contract improvements will apply.  Therefore, only
employees with lower salaries and smaller liability account balances may be susceptible
to incentives.  Shareholders would prefer to see higher-balance employees elect 0>ib .
We return now to the case where employees may not have the financial resources to
adjust their nonpension investments to prefer 0=ib  in their liability accounts.  Since we
are looking for rational contract improvement opportunities, we expect higher paid, more
wealthy employees to prefer small or zero values for ib .  Again, this should be a
disappointment to shareholders.
The experience of employee-choice 401k plans, however, contradicts these findings.
Employees at all levels of compensation and wealth select ib  values substantially
greater than zero28.
                                               
27 Employees can continue to defer even after termination of employment and generally well
past the time that they retire.
28 Bodie and Crane (1997).
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Practical opportunities
Pensions and Investments (2000) reports that the largest corporate defined contribution
plans averaged 31.8% of assets in company stock and 36.7% in other equity in 1999.
The company stock allocation may not reflect employee choice, but the other 36.7%
(54% of the amount not in company stock) does.  In public sector plans, P&I reports
57.5% is invested in equities.  Bodie and Crane (1997) find that slightly more than half of
retirement accounts of a 1996 TIAA-CREF sample are invested in equities with these
same individuals allocating just under half of their nonretirement accounts to equities.
These percentages vary very little by wealth quartile.
Bodie and Crane observe that "generally accepted investment principles"29 include the
advice that fully taxable investments should be held primarily inside tax shelters and that
less taxable investments should be held in individuals' taxable personal accounts.
Shoven and Sialm (1999) adopt a more rigorous approach and conclude "that coupon
bonds and stocks with high annual distributions have a preferred location in the tax-
deferred environment and that tax-exempt bonds and stocks with low annual
distributions have a preferred location in conventional savings accounts."
In light of the experience of employee-choice DC plans, it is likely that firms may
conclude that offering employees a choice of liability benchmarks is an attractive part of
implementing the tax based design strategy proposed by this paper.  Such choices might
well include indexed equity (managed equity makes no sense since the asset side of
these plans should be invested entirely in fixed income), company stock and a short-
term Treasury rate30.  For those firms that do not offer employee-choice DC plans (a
minority), no positive offsets (e.g., T-bills plus 1%) should be considered by the firm and
no negative offsets are likely to be well received by employees.  When firms offer
employee choice in both a DC plan and a CB plan, shareholders may benefit by adding
a small sweetener to the DC plan equity returns (e.g., if the DC plan offers an index
fund, the CB plan might offer the index plus, say, 10 basis points).  The sweetener
                                               
29 A set of principles advocated by practitioners that might also be called "common wisdom of
investment professionals".
30 James F. Moore suggests that options (e.g., equity exposure with a positive guarantee less
than Treasury rates) would be feasible, attractive to employees and consistent with the
shareholder objective of adding equity to the liability crediting rate.
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should encourage employees (who might otherwise be indifferent) to concentrate equity
investments in the CB plan and fixed income in the DC plan31.
Although this design is not shareholder-optimal in the sense in which we have used that
expression earlier, it should provide shareholders with several benefits in comparison to
the usual design:
· Investments by the CB plan in fixed income can assure that shareholders will not be
losers when the plan is compared to the base case or to a cash compensation
alternative.  This will only hold strictly if the plan is at least fully funded as measured
by 0³PE .
· Employee elections of company stock will allow the Black version of the plan to be
implemented thus benefiting nontaxable as well as taxable shareholders without
adding idiosyncratic leveraging which can increase bankruptcy risk and threaten
managerial interests.
· Employee elections of index stock allow tax gains to be achieved using the Black
(with idiosyncratic leverage) or Tepper approaches.
· Employee utility enhancements derived directly from their choices and from their
opportunities for non-corner allocations should inure to shareholders in various ways
including reduced total compensation.
Interestingly, at least two firms have recognized this last advantage and have offered
such plans to their employees32.  Industry sources, however, report that each of these
firms continues to invest the plan assets such that:
0>PP L-A ba
                                               
31 A popular fixed income choice in DC plans is stable value (formerly GICs).  These
investments take advantage of employee persistency to offer "up-the-yield-curve" returns on
money market terms.  These should not be offered on the liability side of the CB plans.
32 Anand (1999) identifies several firms offering employees “investment options” including
BankAmerica and its sister NationsBank, and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Jeremy Gold The Shareholder Optimal Design December 28, 2000
of Cash Balance Plans
50
believing that this inequality measures the firm’s advantage.  As employees alter b , the
sponsors may adjust a  to perpetuate the relationship.
VI Impediments to Implementation
The Tepper-Black tax arbitrage was articulated by its authors in 1981 and 1980
respectively.  Until 1999, empirical researchers failed to find evidence in support of
corporate implementation of the theory.  In a working paper, Myers (1999) cites Bodie et
al (1987), Friedman (1983), Landsman et al (1992) and Peterson (1996) as empirical
studies that did not find support for popular acceptance of the Tepper-Black prescription.
Myers has, for the first time, found a positive empirical response to the tax-arbitrage
theory, reporting a significant relationship between corporate tax benefits from leverage
and the percentage allocation to bonds in defined benefit pension plans.  She estimates
that approximately one-third of the potential benefit from the tax arbitrage opportunity is
utilized with the other two-thirds representing the “aggregate costs of other factors.”
The arbitrage theory stands upon two cornerstones:  transparency and the augmented
balance sheet.  In this section we review three major impediments to implementation of
the arbitrage.  Mainstream actuarial practice defies transparency and leads to the first
two impediments by encouraging:  i) the anticipation of returns to risky investment prior
to the acquittal of the risk (Actuarial Standard of Practice 27, Appendix F);  ii) the
smoothing of volatile results from all sources (including both equity and interest rate
risks) by amortization.  Statutory separation of the pension plan and its sponsor creates
the third impediment by challenging the applicability of the augmented balance sheet.
Decision makers contemplating a {0,1}  cash balance plan face pension
expenses and cash flows in excess of the value received by the employees;
with an ,0}{ a  strategy the employees receive more value than the employer
must contribute or recognize as expense.
This paper has used the transparent intermediary argument to assert that the economic
liabilities of a cash balance plan at any time must equal the sum of the individual account
balances33.  We have also stated that the cost of the plan is equal to the compensation
                                               
33 Assuming full vesting.
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credits granted.  If the financing of the plan is taken into account, we expect risk-
adjusted income (cost if negative) equal to prE  to offset (increase) that cost.  In contrast,
Kwasha Lipton has been quoted in the Introduction:  “A ‘5% of pay plan’ might require a
contribution of only 4% of pay, after a realistic investment differential is taken into
account.”  This statement describes an actuarial process which violates the transparency
assumption, A.7.
In order to show why the Kwasha Lipton claim violates A.7 and presents an illusion of
bargain cost for the employer, we will first show how the Kwasha Lipton claim may be
made.  We will do so circa 1999 although the claim was articulated in the accounting,
actuarial and legislative context of 1985.  Even though changes have occurred since
1985 that reduce the generality of the claim, it is still the case that actuarial and
accounting processes will very often support the Kwasha Lipton position.
The view of Kwasha Lipton and most pension actuaries and actuarial consulting firms
derives from another statement made by Kwasha Lipton and quoted in Section II:  “The
investment differential can be anticipated.”  The author has addressed this directly (Gold,
1999, 2000) elsewhere.  Here we will show why many actuaries and their plan sponsor
clients believe that },{ 0a  plans are “profitable” in the sense that an employer can
provide $1 to an employee at a cost well below $1.  We will also show that, by the same
measure, },{ 10  plans are unprofitable.
There are three overlapping ways to demonstrate the },{ 0a  “bargain”:  i) a long view of
pension plans implying that employers can profit by accepting risks that their employees
will not bear; ii) accounting support for the same conclusion under FAS 87; and iii)
support derived from the cash contribution calculations prescribed by ERISA.
Employer profits by accepting risks
This view may be articulated as a fixed-income-like promise to employees combined
with an a-portfolio that provides an equity premium commensurate with a.  We can
decompose this into:  i) a compensation credit )(k%C tx+  which costs the employer as
much as an equal amount of compensation plus ii) a borrowing )E(L P,tP,t 11 ++ +  used to
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finance the a-portfolio purchase.  This borrowing at a fixed marketed rate to invest in the
equity market creates the long run employer profits.  From a financial perspective,
however, this transaction adds no value; it merely realigns available risks and rewards.
Accounting gains under FAS 87
Almost every large employer will see accounting results for an },{ 0a  plan that reinforces
the idea that this is a profitable arrangement.  Using the algebra from Appendix E, we
investigate the relationship between the plan’s service cost and its compensation credits.
We will determine a condition under which these are the same.  Then we will repeat the
analysis for the relation between a plan’s projected benefit obligation and its opening
account balances.  Finally we look at a typical conversion plan which commences with
assets in excess of the PBO .  The service cost at end of year ][t,t 1+  is given by:
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We know that FAS 87 requires that the settlement rate be related to high quality fixed
income investments and, in an },{ 0a  plan, Li  is likely to be similarly defined.  It is also
reasonable to expect salary increases that are approximately equal to these interest
rates.  Although it is unlikely that any particular plan would set these rates identically, it is
useful to see what results from the assumption that sii L == :
txx
t
t k% CCi)k% (SC ++ =+= 11
which is identical to the end-of-year compensation credit.  Many of the realistic variations
on the assumption of equal rates (e.g., a higher settlement rate) will tend to reduce the
service cost below the compensation credit.  Although it is not difficult to develop a case
where the service cost might exceed the compensation credit, it is fair to observe that an
employer that wishes to recognize a service cost no greater than the compensation
credit should be able to work with its actuary to achieve that result.
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Using the same reasoning as we did for the service cost, we can see that when
sii L == , the PBO  at the beginning of year ][t,t 1+ :
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becomes: 1t-xt tk%CPBO +=
which, under the same assumptions, has been shown (Appendix A) to be the beginning-
of-year plan balance.  As with the service cost, when the employer desires that the PBO
not exceed the plan balances, the actuary should be able to develop suitable
assumptions.  Since the assets of most conversion plans exceed the account balances,
we can conclude that it is highly likely that:
MRVPBO £
Since FAS 87 prescribes that ji <  for an },{ 0a  plan, we will almost always be able to
conclude that the accounting cost will be less than the compensation credits and that
any PE , as we have defined this term, will be credited with an accounting return in
excess of the riskless rate.
There are many combinations of assumptions that may be employed by the plan’s
actuary that will result in the bargain cost that Kwasha Lipton identified as a CB plan
advantage.  As long as no adjustments are made for risk or for tax effects, the bargain is
likely to persist as long as expected returns on invested assets exceed investment
crediting rates.
Note that the gain from comparing the service cost to the compensation credits or the
PBO  to the plan balances is likely to be small when compared to the substantial bargain
that derives from the excess of rate j  over rate i  when the MRV  and the PBO  are of
similar magnitude.  This would be wiped out if the plan were designed as a },{ 10  plan
with the result that the expected return on assets (j)  would be a fixed income rate
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approximately equal to the settlement rate (i) .  Further, the use of an investment
crediting rate )(iL  that included an equity premium would almost always raise the service
cost above the compensation credit.  Thus a },{ 10  plan would either sharply reduce or
reverse the bargain cost inherent in an },{ 0a  plan under current accounting rules.
An FAS 87 Example
Buck Consultants, another leading actuarial consulting firm, has issued a study of
assumptions used by 552 of the Fortune 1000 companies for their 1998 FAS 87
computations.34  The average values are:
%.i 776=
%.j 119=
%.s 544=
Consider the accounting cost for one employee hired at age 25, retiring at age 65, using
these assumptions with no early exits, a 6% investment crediting rate, contemporaneous
funding and with the MRV  defined to equal the market value of the assets.  Note that if
all assumptions are met, the MRV  will equal the PBO  at all times:
000 == MRVPBO
tt-t SCi)PBO(PBO ++= 11
11 t-tt- -jMRVSCiPBOFundingExpense +==
1111 t-tt-t-t MRVSCiPBOj)MRV(FundingMRV ++=++=
tt-tt- PBOPBO SCiPBO =++= 11
The following Table I presents the resulting compensation credits and plan expenses
assuming initial year’s compensation of $10,000 and a 10% compensation credit at the
end of each year of employment (the ratio is independent of these last assumptions).
                                               
34 Buck Consultants (1999).  Many of these plans are traditional DB rather than CB.
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Table I – Compensation Credits and FAS 87 Expense
Age
x+t
Compensation
Credit Expense Ratio
26 1000 583 58%
30 1194 691 58%
35 1491 844 57%
40 1862 1011 54%
45 2325 1181 51%
50 2903 1331 46%
55 3624 1420 39%
60 4525 1377 30%
65 5650 1089 19%
Cash gains under ERISA using Projected Unit Credit
The apparent bargain in the FAS 87 accounting costs derives substantially from the
difference between the expected return on assets and the liability discount rate.  Under
the projected unit credit (PUC) actuarial cost method, the rates are equal to each other
and each incorporates an equity risk premium consistent with the a-portfolio.
Under ERISA, using the PUC method, a bargain is derived from the understatement of
both the normal cost35 and the accrued liability36.  It is clear that the PUC understates the
normal cost and the accrued liability in comparison to the FAS 87 service cost and
projected benefit obligation because the formulas are identical and the PUC discount
rate includes an equity premium.  Further, for an },{ 0a  plan with a significantly nonzero
a, while FAS 87 produces values that are ambiguous in comparison to the compensation
credit and the account balances, the PUC is highly likely to develop a normal cost well
below the compensation credit and an accrued liability well below the PBO .  Although it
is possible to construct cases where this might not be true, in almost every practical
situation these comparisons will hold.
                                               
35 PUC counter part of SC, see Appendix E.
36 PUC counter part of PBO, see Appendix E.
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In a well-funded plan, with P,tLAL < , the interest credit, AL)i(AAV -
37, will exceed the
economic value, PrE .  Combined with a normal cost less than the compensation credit,
once again we find a bargain cost.
With a },{ 10  plan, the discount rate would be set based on purely fixed income
investments while the liability crediting rate would be the expected return on an all-equity
portfolio.  This would almost certainly result in a normal cost in excess of the current
compensation credit and an accrued liability in excess of plan balances.  The overstated
liability would decrease the income based on a positive PE  and might turn it negative.
Thus a },{ 10  plan is highly likely to require contributions in excess of the economic cost
of the plan.
A PUC Example
With the same assumptions as in the previous subsection, the PUC cost will consist of
normal cost alone computed with a discount rate of 9.11%.  Table II shows the costs at
various ages for the same employee shown in Table I.  Because the contribution
requirements start out lower than the FAS 87 expenses, the assets of Table II are
everywhere lower than those of Table I except at age 65 when they are equal.  Since a
real plan would have the same market value of assets (but not necessarily identical
MRV  and AAV ) for FAS 87 and for ERISA, the tables are not directly comparable.
                                               
37 AAV is PUC counter part of MRV, see Appendix E.
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Table II – Compensation Credits and PUC Contributions
Age
x+t
Compensation
Credit Contribution Ratio
26 1000 250 25%
30 1194 355 30%
35 1491 548 37%
40 1862 848 46%
45 2325 1311 56%
50 2903 2028 70%
55 3624 3136 87%
60 4525 4850 107%
65 5650 7499 133%
Although the cost incidence is quite different in Tables I and II, they each represent a
bargain for a population average.  The crossover point between the two tables is age 43
with a 52% ratio and this suggests that, for a typical corporate population, the bargain
might be roughly one half of the compensation credits.
A },{ 10  Plan Example
With a },{ 10  plan, the assumed rates might become:
%.ij 776==
%.iL 119=
%.s 544=
Now the FAS 87 and PUC approaches are the same (because ij = ) and we get the
following Table III:
Jeremy Gold The Shareholder Optimal Design December 28, 2000
of Cash Balance Plans
58
Table III – },{ 10  Plan Example
Age
x+t
Compensation
Credit Cost Ratio
26 1000 1139 114%
30 1194 1480 124%
35 1491 2054 138%
40 1862 2850 153%
45 2325 3955 170%
50 2903 5487 189%
55 3624 7614 210%
60 4525 10565 233%
65 5650 14659 259%
In sum, the argument that an },{ 0a  plan is an actuarial and accounting bargain is
reinforced by methodologies that contradict the implications of transparency.  Many
corporate managers will find the accounting outcome sufficient to lead them to conclude
that the },{ 0a  plan is a bargain and the },{ 10  plan is costly.  Those managers who are
able to “see through” the accounting cannot count on their financial constituents to join
them and thus they will often conclude that the },{ 0a  plan represents the wiser course.
Actuarial cost methods smooth out equity investment volatility allowing the
corporation to earn expected risk premiums without apparent risk.  The
Tepper-Black arbitrage is not viable under this regime.
Actuarial cost methods (ACM’s) were designed to facilitate an orderly budgeting process
for cash contributions to defined benefit plans.  In order to achieve orderliness, each
ACM incorporates a self-correcting process for coping with year-to-year deviations from
long-term expected progress of the plan.
ACM’s always assume a convergence of assets and liabilities at some distant horizon
(e.g., 15 or 30 years hence).  Each year, an actuarial valuation is performed which
develops a vector of expected contributions that, if all assumptions are met, will assure
such convergence.  The expected contribution vector is inherently smooth; it may, for
example, represent a constant percentage of each future year’s expected compensation.
Thus, on an expected basis, volatility is not part of the scheme.
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Each year’s valuation is also designed to align the expected contribution for this year
(the second element in last year’s expected contribution vector) with the leading element
in this year’s vector.  The procedure must be able to account for differences between
actual and expected population data, asset values and plan cash flows between the
previous and current valuations.  Additionally, there must be provision for changes in
plan benefits and actuarial assumptions about future rates of mortality and retirement
and interest, if any.  The aggregate impact of all these variations in the present value of
plan liabilities less plan assets is called “actuarial gain and loss.”38
If the total actuarial gain and loss were attached to the leading value in the expected
cost vector, there could be substantial year-to-year changes in required contributions.
Instead, each ACM has an amortization scheme which effectively identifies the entire
gain and loss and then spreads it out over the whole vector.  Part of the rationale for this
procedure is the desire to create an orderly process but an equally important element is
the actuarial tenet that fluctuations over time tend to cancel out.39  In the case of non-
market sources of gain and loss, this is an application of the law of large numbers
working much like the averaging of daily takes by a gambling casino.  In the case of
market based fluctuations, however, it represents a subscription by an entire profession
to a mean reverting market model.
Because the pension actuarial process is arcane (somewhere between translucent and
opaque), the major impact that pension plans transmit to their sponsor’s financial status
flows through the annual pension expense into corporate P&L.  Prior to the adoption of
FAS 87, plan expenses were identical to plan cash contributions except for occasional,
generally minor, timing differences.40
FAS 87 removed some of the smoothing tools from the actuarial toolbox and
standardized the application of others so as to make company-to-company comparisons
easier.  A series of legislative acts, notably the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
                                               
38 For details of gain and loss analysis see, e.g., Berin (1976).
39 “Any market downswing experienced in one generation will be offset by an upswing in later
generations.” (Burrows, 1999)
40 Prior to the adoption of FAS 87, Accounting Principals Board Opinion 8 (APB 8) ruled.
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1987 (OBRA ‘87) and the legislation enabling the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade of 199441 (GATT), reduced actuarial flexibility with respect to cash contributions.
Nonetheless, the amortization of actuarial gains and losses over many years survives
powerfully today.  Under FAS 87 (Appendix E), the expected return (j)  on smoothed
plan assets (MRV)  flows directly into the pension expense.  The difference between the
actual return on the market value of plan assets and jMRV  goes into a suspense
account.  Differences between the newly computed PBO  and its expected value based
on the prior valuation is lumped into the same bucket which is rolled forward from year to
year in order to accommodate any offsets that occur.  As long as the entire bucket value
remains in a “corridor” (a range of error equal to plus or minus 10% of the greater of the
PBO  and the MRV ), the accumulated gains and losses do not affect the current year’s
pension expense.  Once the corridor is exceeded, a fraction (e.g. 1/15) of the overflow is
added or subtracted in the current year.
To the extent that financial analysts deal with pension plan effects primarily through
pension expenses, the Tepper-Black arbitrage is not viable.  If the shareholder does not
experience the financial impact implied by the transparent intermediary model, then the
arbitrage is without merit.
Smoothing pension plan assets, liabilities and expenses not only defeats the arbitrage,
but it also introduces systematic bias into the valuation of securities by financial analysts.
This is an issue addressed in Gold (2000).
The “augmented balance sheet” is a theoretical nicety but it ignores the
strong legal separation between the pension plan and the corporation.  The
legal reality implies that the corporate leveraging recommended by Black
may constitute an unacceptable risk to lenders.
Treynor’s augmented balance sheet is designed to emphasize the financial integration of
a corporation and its pension plan.  As such it suggests integrated financial management
of the kind employed by Black and Tepper.  It does not, however, describe an entity with
all the freedom that we usually associate with a single balance sheet.  We cannot freely
                                               
41 GATT legislation of 1994 incorporated provisions of bills sometimes identified as The
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move assets across the horizontal border between the corporation and the plan.  We
have already discussed the tax considerations that govern this border crossing and
know that these can work for or against shareholders depending on plan design.
There is also a strong statutory barrier.  Although many of the financial implications of a
corporation’s contribution strategy and a plan’s asset allocation affect shareholders
(particularly in a well-funded plan), Sharpe (1976) and Treynor (1977) discuss employee
interests before and after the passage or ERISA and the PBGC’s interests since then.42
One issue sometimes raised and often dismissed is the ERISA admonition: “…a
fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries….”43  Some misunderstand this to mean that some effort
to maximize returns is required.  Because the primary societal role of plan assets is to
collateralize benefit promises, a better interpretation is that the probability that all
promises are met should be kept high.  In the context of amending ERISA to strengthen
the PBGC, Congress declared:  “is desirable to increase the likelihood that full benefits
will be paid to participants and beneficiaries of such plans.”44  Under this interpretation,
plan strategies along the }
L
A
,{
P
Paa  line of Section V might be deemed especially
prudent.
In the context of the Black version of the arbitrage proposed in Section IV, the most
important impediment to implementation derives from the fact that plan assets may not
be easily reached by corporate creditors.  This means that any proposal to increase
corporate leverage by borrowing to buy back company stock will face an uphill battle.
Not only can the assets not be pledged or assigned, but the lenders cannot have any
                                                                                                                                           
Retirement Protection Act of 1994 (RPA ’94).
42 Pre-ERISA, promises received by employees were only as good as the assets of the plan
allowed.  If plan assets fell below plan liabilities, the corporation had the right to put the
assets to the plan participants without incurring a residual liability.  This put option
represented an asset of the corporation that Treynor records in the augmented balance
sheet.  With the passage of ERISA, the PBGC was inserted as a guarantor of a substantial
portion of benefits accrued by participants and the PBGC had the right to pursue the sponsor
to recoup the shortfall.  ERISA also tightened fiduciary standards for plan managers in the
name of protecting employee interests.  Treynor observes that the major beneficiary of these
standards was the PBGC.
43 29 USC 1104(a)1.
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assurance that the plan will continue to invest in bonds rather than in equities.  Even
after all parties thoroughly understand the financial issues, lenders (banks and bond
holders) will be placed at some disadvantage.  Covenants in current borrowings may
make it difficult or impossible to add leverage even if new borrowing is available.
How much of a disadvantage depends of course on the numbers but we know that any
borrowing done to support the transaction will have to be done at a higher cost than if
the augmented balance sheet representation were statutorily correct.  In effect, the
benefits of the arbitrage plan are certain to be reduced by this and other friction costs.
This cost should be modest when compared to the value of the arbitrage but the cost will
be greater for those corporations whose borrowing costs are already relatively high.
Black argues that the value of the arbitrage derives from the reallocation of plan assets
and that the rest of the arbitrage is offered by him primarily to defend or prove his case.
His point is that, after tax considerations, the corporation’s risk adjusted returns will have
been increased whether or not the corporate leveraging is executed.
VII Conclusions
This paper extends the Tepper-Black pension tax arbitrage into a cash balance plan
environment.  Black and Tepper each assumed that defined benefit pension liabilities
were well represented by fixed income instruments.  Here we extend the liability model
to include arbitrary marketed securities.  This model tells us that shareholders benefit
when the liabilities are defined in terms of equities.
Traditional defined benefit plans were designed to retain long-service older employees.
The enabling mechanism is a sharply convex cost curve, poorly matched to average
productivity by age, that offers little value to those who leave early in their careers.
Young, mobile, presumably productive, employees are not retained by their employers,
nor do they accumulate sufficient retirement resources as they change jobs.  Older,
presumably less productive, employees are encouraged by traditional DB plans to
remain in service.  This has led to expensive employer bribes (e.g., subsidized early
retirement benefits and open window plans) to motivate their departures.
                                                                                                                                           
44 29 USC 1001(b) as modified by SEPPAA (1986).
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Employers and younger employees both see that defined contribution plans better serve
their needs.  Startup employers offer defined contribution plans exclusively.  Some
sponsors have terminated their DB arrangements and offered DC substitutes.  More
mature employers with substantial DB plan surpluses find that excise taxes present a
barrier to such exit.  CB plans offer an attractive alternative to this latter group.  The CB
liabilities are designed to mimic DC plans while the assets (and surpluses) may be
retained for the benefit of shareholders without excise tax penalties.
The process of converting DB plans to CB plans has created a new set of difficulties.
Often older employees find that the steep accrual curve that they anticipated has been
flattened leading to significantly lower projected pension benefits.  Although younger
employees generally like CB plans, they are not always happy with the fixed income
rates of return on plan balances, especially when they compare these returns to their DC
plan equity investments.  Dissatisfied employees of various ages have joined together to
create a political voice which is now being heard in Washington.
At least part of the problems now in view may be ameliorated by the design opportunities
presented in this paper.  The idea that the liability equity allocation b  can be raised
above zero producing benefits for shareholders and for some employees offers potential
for a whole class of innovative CB plan designs.  Certainly the employee choice plan
(individual b ’s) combined with fixed income investments )( 0=a  can work to the benefit
of all direct constituents (arguably, taxpayers are the losers).
The major impediments to the implementation of designs in this new class include
actuarial and accounting systems that obfuscate financial realities.  The old admonition:
“eschew actuarial obfuscation” has new justification.  The very nature of the cash
balance plan (where liabilities are first stated as present values rather than as contingent
future cash flow streams) may make the intellectual hurdle lower than it was when the
Black and Tepper papers were published.  The question: “how can it be possible to give
an employee $1 at a cost of $.50?” may gain some traction among financial officers,
shareholders, accountants and actuaries.
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The impediments related to the statutory separation of the plan and the sponsor may
persist but for a great number of solid companies with well-funded plans, this
impediment is more a process that requires management than it is a barrier to action.
Jeremy Gold The Shareholder Optimal Design December 28, 2000
of Cash Balance Plans
65
Appendices
A Patterns of Accrual
Employer economic costs for defined contribution and cash balance plans
Under a defined contribution plan, the employer cost each year is equal to the
contribution made45 and, in the generic case, this is a constant percentage of
compensation.  The contribution is tax deductible to the corporation and, from the
employer/shareholder point of view, is the same as an equal amount of compensation.
From the employee perspective, a tax-sheltered contribution may be superior to taxable
ordinary compensation.  We discuss the employee perspective further in Section ?
Under a cash balance plan, if i) compensation credits are funded contemporaneously, ii)
the liability benchmark is a marketed security and iii) assets are invested in the liability
benchmark, the economic cost to the employer is equal to the compensation credits
added to employee accounts46, as it must be since a plan so designed and implemented
virtually clones47 a DC plan.  Although no CB plans are designed and managed as
clones, it is analytically useful to identify separately the opportunities for economic gains
and losses that derive from deviations from the three provisos above.  Collectively, we
identify the choices available in these three areas as the “strategic” opportunities
associated with a CB plan and we identify the resulting economic gains or losses as
“strategic” as well:
                                               
45 ERISA provides that plans must may be designed so that employer contributions are not
vested until some time after they have been made.  To a small degree, this reduces the cost
borne by the employer.  This relatively small matter is ignored throughout this paper.  Further,
although rarely exercised, many DC plans and all CB plans offer an annuity alternative to the
account balance;  we assume that this is merely a choice (not a valuable option) and that any
annuity is priced at its expected value.
46 Since an employee separating from service is entitled to his entire vested plan balance.
47 We ignore small differences in administrative costs and PBGC premiums.
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· To the extent that cash contributions exceed compensation credits, the employer is
accelerating funding; Tepper shows48 that this is economically gainful.  Conversely,
funding less than the compensation credits (as very frequently occurs in practice49) is
costly.
· As we show in Section IV, Result 2, when returns on non-marketed securities are
used to benchmark investment credits, the economic cost must be adjusted to reflect
the difference between the liability benchmark rate and an appropriate marketed
rate.
· When taxes are taken into consideration, as shown in Section IV, Result 4, the
economic cost is increased when asset equity exposure exceeds liability equity
exposure and is decreased in the opposing case.
For the remainder of this appendix we work with DC plans and only those CB plans that
are clones. Thus, when comparing to DB plans, we treat DC and CB plans as identical
and refer to them generically as either “accumulation” plans or as “DC/CB” plans.  In the
same vein, we may refer to compensation credits or contributions without distinction.
Employer costs for traditional defined benefit plans
Under a traditional defined benefit plan, benefit promises usually provide for a fixed
income benefit stream and this has been modeled by Black, Tepper and many others as
equivalent to a marketed fixed income instrument, most often without credit risk.
Although the benefit streams are uncertain with respect to individual participants due to
demographic uncertainty, this uncertainty is deemed to be orthogonal to market risk and
fully diversifiable for large groups of employees.  We adhere to this model herein.
The value associated with a DB plan that has the same economic significance as the
compensation credit may be expressed as the algebraic excess of i) the present value of
                                               
48 In order to be most gainful, such accelerated contributions must be currently deductible by
the employer under IRC Section 404 and, as discussed in Appendix D, must not significantly
add to the probability that the plan will fall into an “overfunding trap.”
49 As discussed in Appendix E, actuarial methodology enables and encourages optimistic
underfunding.
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future benefit payments assuming the employee’s service is terminated at yearend (for
reasons other than death or disability) over ii) the corresponding value as of the
beginning of the year increased by the accrual of interest, mortality and disability
discounts thereon50.
One feature that distinguishes accumulation plans from DB plans is that the value of the
accumulation plan is fixed even when alternative payout schedules may be selected.
Under a DB plan, various payout choices may be offered with substantially different
values.  For example, an employee whose service has terminated may, if eligible,
choose between a benefit commencing when he attains age 65 or a reduced benefit
commencing at an earlier date.  Often the earlier benefit will be more valuable (i.e.,
costly) from the plan’s point of view even though not all employees will elect the earlier
commencement.  It is also common for DB plans to permit the form of annuity to be
adjusted from a life annuity to another form (spousal joint and survivor annuities must be
available per ERISA) or to a single lump sum payment and these conversions are often
effected at rates that incorporate some subsidization.
Thus, when we seek to measure “the present value of future benefit payments assuming
the employee’s service is terminated at yearend (for reasons other than death or
disability)” we must do so on an expected basis that assigns probabilities to each of the
value-altering choices offered under the plan.  While this does not make the comparison
of economic costs across plans inaccurate, it does mean that the value of the DC/CB
account balance is much more readily assessable by, and tangible to, employees.  This
is deemed to be a very attractive aspect of accumulation plans.
Comparative accrual patterns
In this subsection we look at the way in which the patterns of cost for DB and
accumulation plans compare over the working lifetimes of employees.  We restrict the
DB plan benefit to a life annuity payable at the normal age of 65.  The accumulation plan
benefit is assumed to be paid in a life annuity form beginning at age 65 as well and we
                                               
50 In general, participant mortality in a DB plan results in a loss of benefit value while disability
implications are ambiguous.  As with DC plans, typical CB plans provide the full account
value in the event of death or disability.
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further assume that the cost of a life annuity paying $1/year for a 65 year-old is a fixed
certain number, 65a .
Our comparison is made for one employee hired at age 25 with an annual rate of
compensation equal to 25$C .  We assume that this compensation grows at a compound
annual rate of s .  The rate of interest used to discount DB plan benefits ( i ) equals to the
liability crediting rate under the accumulation plan Li .  The employee survives to age 65
with certainty and without disability.
The CB plan credits k%  of trailing annual compensation to the participant account at
each yearend.  Thus k%  of 25$C  is credited just when the participant turns 26 and
s)(k%$C +125  is credited when he turns 27.  An investment credit at rate Li  is added to
the prior year’s balance at the same time.  Thus the plan balance at age 27 is equal to
s)]()i[(k%$C L +++ 1125 .  The plan balance at the beginning of year ][t,t 1+ , when the
employee is exact age t+25 , is then given by:
1
25125
125
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
t-
t-
LtL
t-
s)(Cwhere C
])-
s
i
]/[(-)
s
i
[(k%C
+=
+
+
+
+
+
+
A special case of this occurs when sL =i :
125 t-tk%C +
The balance at age 65 will buy a life annuity equal to:
65
6440
a
k%C
Note that the balance at any age t+25  will, without further compensation credits, buy a
life annuity at age 65 equal to:
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65
64
a
kt%C
Also note that, as long as the compensation at age tx +  is given by
25
25 1
t-x
tx s)(CC
+
+ += , the account balance of an employee hired at age x  will, at age
tx + , without further compensation credits, also buy a life annuity at age 65 equal to:
65
64
a
kt%C
In other words, for an employee on the specified compensation path, the life annuity at
age 65 depends on service (t)  but is independent of hire age (x) .
Because both k  and 65a  are constants, we can replace 65k/a  by M .  Thus the life
annuity purchased by the plan balance is given by:
64Mt%C
which may be recognized to be equal to the same annuity offered by a DB plan that
provides %M  of final compensation for each year of service (Gold, 1983).  Unlike with
the DC/CB plan, where the annuity is the same regardless of which t  years are worked,
the DB plan benefit will be as shown only if the t  years end at age 65.
If, for example, the t-year period ended at age 55, the annuity beginning at age 65 would
be given by:
54Mt%C
which is smaller than the annuity above.
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A graphical example
When we set 25=x , 0001025 ,C = , 1065 == ak , 06.siL == , we get the results depicted
in Figure 2.  Compensation, the black line measured by the left hand axis, starts at age
25 at $10,000/year and grows to $97,035 for the year from age 64 to 65.  The DC/CB
benefits that will be paid as a life annuity commencing at age 65 are shown along the
yellow line that is measured by the right hand axis.  If the employee works from age 25
to age 65, the yellow line shows that his retirement annuity will be equal to $38,814/year
which is 40% of $97,035.  If, alternatively, the employee works from age 25 to 45 or for
any other twenty years, the age 65 life annuity will amount to $19,407/year or 20% of
$97,305.
The DB plan benefits that will be paid as a life annuity commencing at age 65 are shown
along the pink curve that is measured by the right hand axis. If the employee works from
age 25 to age 65, the pink curve shows that his retirement annuity will be equal to
$38,814/year which is 40% of $97,035 just as with the accumulation plan.  In the DB
case, if the employee works from age 45 to 65, the age 65 life annuity will amount to
$19,407/year or 20% of $97,305 (not illustrated).  If, however, the employee under the
DB plan works from age 25 to 45, the age 65 life annuity will amount to only $6,051/year
or less than 7% of $97,305.
Figure 3 shows the annual economic costs for the DB plan (pink curve measured in
$/year on the left hand axis, blue curve measured as a percentage of annual
compensation on the right hand axis) and for the DC/CB plan (yellow curve measured in
$/year on the left hand axis, dark blue horizontal line measured as a constant 10% of
annual compensation on the right hand axis).  It is clear that the annual economic cost of
the DB plan is less than that of the accumulation plan at ages younger than 50 and is
greater at older ages.
The DB plan cost is computed as described in the previous subsection as the value of
the benefit accrued by age tx + :
t)-(x
t-x
i)(
k%tC
+
+
+ 65
1
1
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less the value of the benefit accrued one year earlier incremented for one year’s interest
discount (recall, we have assumed no mortality or disability prior to age 65):
i)(
i)(
)Ck%(t-
)t--(x
t-x +
+ +
+ 1
1
1
165
2
which equals: t)-(x
t-x
i)(
)(stk%C
+
+
+
+
65
1
1
1
and because the DC/CB plan cost is:
1t-xk%C +
the crossover occurs at the smallest integer value of t satisfying:
1
1
1
65 >+
+
+ t)-(xi)(
)(st
which, in this example, occurs at age 50 when 25=t .
An accounting “solution”
The accrual pattern shown in Figure 3 is undesirable from several points of view (one of
which is the poor mismatch between employee productivity and compensation cost
including pension accruals) and this has been a known difficulty with DB plans for at
least fifty years.  Although the smallest plans circa 1950 (those funded in an “Individual
Policy Pension Trust” or IPPT) generally had to follow this accrual pattern (which
corresponds to the traditional Unit Credit ACM), larger plans used ACM’s51 that leveled
costs more evenly.  For the very special case used to prepare Figure 3, the Projected
Unit Credit method which underlies FAS 87 would follow the DC plan lines even though
the plan promises follow the DB lines.
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In effect, the accounting followed a long-term theory of the employment “contract” under
which early excess productivity of employees was deemed to be set aside as a shadow
account for an unaccrued pension benefit which was then drawn down in later years.
This fiction, arguably not terribly far-fetched in an earlier era, seems to have been
strained by today’s mobile workforce.
A mobile career
Despite the much higher economic costs for the DB plan in later years, the total
economic cost of the DB plan must be less than that for the DC/CB plan because the
value carried away by employees who exit from service is strictly less for the DB plan
than for the DC/CB plan for all ages less than age 65 and is exactly equal at that age.
Thus, a given normal retirement benefit may be more cheaply provided by a DB than by
a DC/CB plan.  How much less the DB plan costs cannot be determined unless we have
some idea of the fraction of employees who separate from service at each attained age.
We can, however, perform an analysis for one employee who works for ten years at
each of four separate employers who maintain identical DB plans.  The benefit that he
accumulates from all four employers by the time he attains age 65 will be of the same
value as one employer will pay to four different employees each of whom works for ten
years sequentially at progressive ages over the same forty years.  This situation is
illustrated in Figure 4.
In Figure 4, the pink curve is identical to the pink curve of Figure 2 although this time it is
measured on the left hand axis.  It represents the accrual of cost for one employee who
works for the same employer for all forty years.  The lower blue curves represent
accruals that an employee generates when he is employed under a DB plan for four
consecutive ten-year periods by four different employers.  Each plan provides a benefit
at age 65 equal to 1% for each of the ten years of service multiplied by the final year’s
pay with that employer.  Thus at each separation, the employee earns a deferred age 65
annuity equal to 10% of his last years compensation.  The dark blue curve sums these
four separate accruals across the four employers over time.  The employee’s age 65
annuity is now given by:
                                                                                                                                           
51 Trowbridge, 1952.
Jeremy Gold The Shareholder Optimal Design December 28, 2000
of Cash Balance Plans
73
)CCC%(C 6454443410 +++
instead of the more valuable benefit given by the pink curve as:
6440%C
A DC/CB plan provides higher benefits for employees who divide their careers among
more than one employer.  In this example, job switches have no effect upon the ultimate
level of benefit earned by the normal retirement age.  The preservation of benefit levels
despite job changes is usually termed “portability”.  In practice, although there may be
some gains or losses attributable to changing jobs, portability is an intrinsic property of
DC/CB plans.  Lack of portability, meaning diminution of career benefits for mobile
employees, is an intrinsic property of single employer corporate plans.  Social Security
provides an intrinsically portable DB plan.  Some defined benefit systems maintained by
public employers provide portability as long as public employees change jobs within the
same system (such as one state or one large city or county or the federal government)
and some Taft-Hartley multi-employer plans provide portable benefits for union
employees who continue to work in the same industry.
Portability is a plus for the mobile employees of today.  This is one of the elements
contributing to the rise of DC plans and the conversion of DB plans into CB plans in the
last two decades.  The lack of portability inherent in the  DB plan design was deemed a
positive feature by more traditional employers who found it to be a retention incentive.
B Conversion Designs
Paying for portability
Because a DC/CB plan that matches the normal retirement benefit provided to a long-
service employee by a DB plan can be much more expensive than the DB plan,
employers who switch to accumulation plans may reduce their contribution level below
the k%  necessary to match the DB plan.  In the case of 401k plans, the design will
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incorporate, and provide incentives for, tax-effective employee contributions to make up
the shortfall.  In the case of DB to CB conversions, employers will simply provide
compensation credits lower than k% .  Part of their reasoning may be that they are
spending more on younger employees and that the level percentage of pay throughout a
career is a better match to employee productivity over time than is the rising cost pattern
associated with DB plans.  This may also, to some degree, represent a reaction to the
now more than twenty year old Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) that
makes it more difficult for employers to treat younger workers preferentially52.  Figure 5
illustrates a 8% CB plan and a 6% CB accumulation plan in addition to the 10% plan that
matches the final pay DB plan at age 65.  Based on the actual plan data it is possible to
target a contribution level that will match or reduce costs relative to the DB plan.
Certainly this contribution level will be substantially less than 10%.
DB to CB Transitions
Figure 6 takes the DB plan (pink curve) and the 6% CB plan (blue line) from Figure 5
and illustrates possible transition schemes as they affect an employee aged 58 at the
time of conversion.  It can be seen that the 58 year-old has accrued a higher annual
pension benefit ($21.3k) under the DB plan than he would have ($19.2k) under the new
6% CB plan53.  ERISA requires that the accrued benefit not be reduced but does not
require that any benefits be added for service after the plan converts.
A controversial and ungenerous approach, dubbed “wearaway” grants the employee the
larger of his old-plan accrued benefit and what he would have had had he been covered
by the new plan throughout his career54.  For the employee shown (along the orange
angled line), this means that the benefit remains at ($21.3k) through age 61 and
increases along the 6% CB path thereafter.  At age 65, this employee will receive a
pension equal to $23.3k which may be compared to the DB pension of $38.8k.
                                               
52 An unanswered question: how does ADEA apply to various cash balance plan designs?
VanDerhei (1999).
53 The are many ways for the conversion design to create a minimum plan balance that
exceeds the accruing plan balance.  The example shown is merely one such instance.
54 In practice, wearaway is more likely to affect somewhat younger employees (e.g., age 50)
and to be caused by the application of statutory minimum values attributable to a combination
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The grandfather approach allows the employee to continue to be covered by the DB plan
formula for the remainder of his career.  This results in his earning a pension of $38.8k.
Some employers have chosen to offer grandfathering as an option to be elected by
employees at the time of conversion.  An offer of grandfathering for all employees
implies that the employer cannot begin to reduce costs for some time.  A common
variation allows employees to choose grandfathering only if they meet some age and/or
service requirements (e.g., age 50 with 15 years of service as of the transition date).
Such an approach tries to balance the employer’s desire to move to the new plan with
the needs and expectations of older employees.  Inevitably, under such an approach,
some employees just miss the cutoff.
An approach which is generally intermediate to the wearaway and grandfathering
approaches may be designated as “additive”.  Under this approach, shown along the
light blue line, the starting CB balance is set equal to the old-plan accrued level of
$21.3k but, unlike under the wearaway, the employee immediately begins to add
additional benefits equal to the incremental benefits under the new 6% CB plan.
Practical transition schemes may be designed anywhere between the grandfather and
the wearaway.  One approach, not illustrated, is a variation of the additive scheme
wherein eligible employees are credited with a higher “transition” compensation crediting
rate.  Thus, for example, the additive line might be tilted up to follow a path parallel to the
8% or 10% CB plan instead of, as shown, a line parallel to the 6% CB plan.
C Excise Taxes on Assets Reverted to Plan Sponsors
Since 198655, an excise tax has been imposed on such reversions in addition to (and not
deductible against, per IRC Section 275(a)6 applied to Chapter 43) the income tax.  This
tax has, since 1990, been at the rate of 20% of reverted assets if a qualified replacement
plan (typically a DC plan would replace a DB plan) is funded with not less than 25% of
                                                                                                                                           
of subsidized benefits and discount rates prescribed by the PBGC.  An illustration of this
more practical situation goes beyond the confines of our deliberately streamlined example.
55 10% excise tax on asset reversions, IRC Section 4980, added by Pub. L. 99-514, title XI,
Sec. 1132(a), for reversions after December 31, 1985.  Increased to 15% by Pub. L. 100-647,
title VI, Sec. 6069(a), for reversions after December 31, 1988.  Increased to 20% by Pub. L.
101-508, title, XII, Sec. 12001 which further provided a rate of 50% unless the employer used
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the surplus (the residual after settling plan liabilities), and at a 50% rate in the absence
of such replacement.
The impetus for the inclusion of the excise tax was Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-
Ohio, 1977 - 1995) reacting to the reversion of excess plan assets by more than a few
large and visible corporations in the early to mid 1980’s.  The result has been that
substantial plan reversions by taxable corporations are now rare.
To see why, consider a surplus of assets over the cost of settling liabilities equal to $1
for a corporation in the 35% ( ct ) federal income tax bracket.  If the $1 is returned to the
corporation directly, a 50% excise tax is applied in addition to the 35% marginal income
tax rate leaving $.15 after tax.  If the employer elects to divert $.25 towards a qualified
replacement plan, then the revertible amount is reduced to $.75 against which a 55% tax
is imposed (20% excise plus 35% income) so that the after-tax return to the corporation
is $.3375.  Clearly the law intends to induce the latter choice if any reversion is to occur.
The recovery of $.3375 may be compared to a recovery of $.65 ( )-$( ct1 ) before the
addition of IRC Section 4980.  In Section II, we hypothesize that one of the reasons for
the adoption of CB plans by plan sponsors relates to this excise tax provision.
D Funding Considerations
The passage of ERISA in 1974 established the PBGC which introduced federal
guarantees for DB pension plans that were unable to meet the promises made to plan
participants.  Sharpe (1976) characterized the existence of the PBGC guarantee as a
put option.  If the premium for the PBGC coverage is not properly determined, Sharpe
concluded that corporations could maximize shareholder interests by a combination of
higher pension liabilities (offered to employees in exchange for reductions in other
compensation), lower pension assets (caused by deliberately smaller employer
contributions) and investment in risky assets.
                                                                                                                                           
at least 20% of the otherwise revertible assets to fund immediate benefit increases or at least
25% to fund a qualified replacement plan, for reversions after September 30, 1990.
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Since that time the PBGC has defended itself by successfully pursuing legislative action
to raise premiums, to adjust premiums for risk (albeit inadequately), to require faster
funding for poorly funded plans, to increase the amount and status of claims that the
PBGC can make against the sponsor of a terminated plan, to restrict voluntary
termination (put exercise) to plans that are sufficiently funded (thus the put must be out-
of-the-money when exercised by the sponsor) or to insufficient plans sponsored by
“distressed”56 employers.
Nonetheless, for a distressed company with an underfunded DB plan, the Sharpe PBGC
put may provide an incentive for deliberately risky investment.  In a CB plan this can
encourage a mismatching of assets and liabilities.
Prior to the enactment of the first of the Metzenbaum reversion excise taxes (Appendix
C), overfunding of a plan, regardless of cause, was potentially beneficial to
shareholders.  As long as the recapture of such excess funding was subject only to
income taxes (i.e., at rate ct ) at the corporate level, the existence of excess assets
added to potential shareholder gains.  As Tepper shows, if such an PE  were invested in
fixed income, shareholders gain; invested in equity, shareholders face a wash.  With the
advent of the excise tax, however, there exists a tax trap for highly overfunded plans.  If
the amount of excess is so large that it cannot be absorbed by the regular development
of newly earned benefit accruals, it must ultimately be subjected to the excise tax upon
termination at some later date57.  In effect, each plan is short an "excise tax call" option if
its assets reach levels sufficiently in excess of liabilities.
Combining the long position in the Sharpe put and the short position in the excise tax
call, there is a sinusoidal curve to the value of PE  (picture a sine function from 2/p-  to
2/p+ ).  As the assets fall well below the level of the liabilities, the put increases in value
and the PBGC shares in the marginal downside more than it does in the marginal upside
resulting in the convex portion of the sinusoid.  As the assets rise well above the liability
                                               
56 Single-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1986 (SEPPAA) as part of the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act.
57 This is not to say that this is inescapable.  A company in such a position may get better value
for its surplus by using it to pay for post-retirement health care costs using IRC Section 420
or it may acquire or be acquired by a company with an underfunded plan, etc.
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level, the present value of future excise taxes grows in a fashion that creates the
concave portion of the sinusoid.
Our assumption A.6 is intended to restrict us to the relatively linear center of the curve
and in general we value neither the put nor the call.  We do not think that this is a very
serious restriction because we are focusing on the large majority of major corporate
plans that are generally in the linear section of the curve.  Additionally, the accelerated
contributions now required for poorly funded plans (together with other PBGC instigated
rules) has substantially diminished the significance of the put.  Similarly, the IRS has
promoted legislation tightening the limits on tax deductible annual contributions (most
recently there has been a moderate loosening) making significant overfunding somewhat
less likely.  The option to transfer excess assets to health care plans under IRC Section
420 may serve to reduce the value of the excise tax call.  Further, many plan sponsors
are aware of the overfunding trap and their efforts to avoid it also reduce the call value.
E Actuarial and Accounting Costs
Appendix G provides a verbal summary of Statement No. 87 of Financial Accounting
Standards (FAS 87).  Appendix J defines notation used throughout this paper.  In this
appendix we develop the algebra for pension accounting cost (expense) under FAS 87
in the narrow case where actuarial gains and losses and other amortizable components
of periodic expense are treated without detail.  We also develop the algebra for the
employer’s cash contributions to a pension under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA).  Again this is done narrowly using one of the acceptable actuarial
methods, Projected Unit Credit (PUC), and again without detail with respect to
amortization computations and various minimums and maximums contained in ERISA.
FAS 87 expenses
The general equation for accounting expense under FAS 87 is given by:
ttt AMT-jMRVSCiPBOExpense ++= +1
where i  is the “settlement” rate which is used to compute the Projected Benefit
Obligation (PBO ) and the Service Cost (SC ).  This rate is presently interpreted to be no
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greater than the Aa bond rate for bonds of similar duration to the liabilities.  j  is the
expected return on assets58.  AMT  represents annual amortization of the difference
between PBO  and MRV .
Both the PBO  and the SC  represent discounted values based on benefits payable
upon several possible events  (retirement, termination, disability, death) and at various
future dates.  For a generic cash balance plan, the benefit payable at each such future
date is the account balance at that time.  Thus the values may be computed as the sum
(over dates) of the discounted projected account balances multiplied by the event
probabilities.  For ease of exposition, we will assume that the event “retirement at age
65” has a probability of one and all other events have probability zero.
We have defined P,tL  as the sum of the account balances at the beginning of a year.
Since we have also used t  to represent the number of years, as of the beginning of the
year, since an employee was hired at age x , it is consistent to define PL  for one
employee so that -xP,t)-(xtP, LL 6565 =++  represents the age 65 account balance.
Using notation consistent with Appendix A:
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The PBO  is the present value of a linear proration of this future balance as of the
beginning of the year ]1,[ +tt :
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58 Consistent with Actuarial Standard of Practice (ASOP) 27, this rate is based on the
anticipated asset allocation of the plan.
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where the fraction 
-x
t
65
 represents years employed divided by total career years.
Similarly, the 1+tSC  is present value of one year’s fraction of the future balance as of the
end of the year:
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The amortizations can be quite idiosyncratic and path dependent but they generally
spread the algebraic difference between the PBO  and the MRV  over a limited period of
future years:
N
PBO-MRV
AMT =
where N, which changes from year to year, need not be an integer and is no greater
than fifteen.  When the plan’s actuarial assets (MRV)  and liabilities (PBO)  are equal,
amortizations equal zero.  When this is true and all assumptions are met during the year:
11 ++ =++ tttt PBOSCiPBOPBO
1+=+ ttt MRVjMRVMRV
so that the expense rationally links the beginning and ending plan assets and liabilities.
ERISA contributions using PUC
The Projected Unit Credit actuarial cost method predates FAS 87 and formed much of its
basis.  As a result, it is the actuarial cost method that most closely resembles FAS 87.
One major difference is that the PUC uses the same interest rate for both assets and
liabilities.  Although we will use the symbol i  for this rate, under ASOP 27 the rate is
based on the expected asset returns based on the plan’s anticipated asset allocation
and thus the rate is more like the j  rate of FAS 87.
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Another difference is that the PUC incorporates interest on the difference between plan
assets and liabilities into the amortization factor.  Under the PUC the equation that
computes the plan’s annual contribution )(CONT  is:
1++= t
tt NC
A
-AAVAL
CONT
where AL  is the accrued liability and NC  is the normal cost under the PUC method.
These are defined by the same algebra as are the PBO  and the SC  under FAS 87
except for the definition of the discount rate i .  The actuarial asset value (AAV)  is
defined similarly to the FAS 87 MRV .  The amortization factor (A)  is an annuity certain.
Unlike the amortization factor for FAS 87, the PUC factor includes an interest charge
that is applied to the unfunded accrued liability.  We can make the contribution equation
look more like the accounting equation by substituting:
N'
i
A
11
+=
then: t
tt
tt -iAAVN'
-AAVAL
NCiALCONT ++= +1
which highlights the application of the discount rate i  to both the assets and the
liabilities.  N'  is not equal to N  but each serves the purpose of spreading the difference
between actuarial assets and liabilities over future periods.
Cash balance plan economic cost
In Appendix A we defined the economic cost of a DC/CB clone plan to be equal to the
compensation credits provided by the employer.  The clone plan matched assets and
liabilities.  If we allow for a mismatch and allow as well for the returns on assets and
liabilities to enter into the “cost” computation without adjustment for risk and taxes, we
can create an accounting cost with economic elements:
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tA
t
xP,tL MVA-is)(k%CLiCost ++= 1
Under this formulation, with MVA  defined as the market value of assets, the plan
liabilities equal the account balances and the borrowing and investing (financing) costs
may be separated from compensation cost.
F Actuarial Standard of Practice No. 27, Selection of
Economic Assumptions for Measuring Pension Obligations
Adopted by the ASB in December, 1996, ASOP 27 supercedes ASOP 4 with respect to
economic assumptions.  Generally, economic assumptions include discount rates,
investment returns, inflation, compensation scales and related factors.  They may be
distinguished from noneconomic (demographic) assumptions relating to rates of death,
disability, termination of employment, retirement, marriage, etc.
For the purposes of this paper, Section 3.6 Selecting an Investment Return Assumption
and a Discount Rate is most relevant.  Sections 3.5 Selecting an Inflation Assumption
and Section 3.7 Selecting a Compensation Scale are pertinent to Section V Counter
Arguments.
Section 3.6 states in part that “The discount rate is used to determine the present value
of expected future plan payments.  Generally, the appropriate discount rate is the same
as the investment return assumption.  But for some purposes, such as SFAS 87 [herein
FAS 87] or unfunded plan valuations, the discount rate may be selected independently
of the plan’s investment return assumption, if any.”
Section 3.62 Constructing the Investment Return Range details two example methods:
a. Building-Block Method – after identifying asset classes and, for each such class,
estimating real returns and inflation, “compute an average, weighted real-return
range reflecting the plan’s expected asset class mix; and … combine [this] …
with the expected inflation range.”
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b. Cash Flow Matching Method – “Under the cash flow matching method, the expected
future investment return range is viewed as the combination of (i) the internal rate
of return on a bond portfolio [of noncallable, high-quality corporate or U.S.
government bonds] with interest and principal payments approximately matching
the plan’s expected disbursements, and (ii) a risk adjustment range.”  The risk
adjustment range should reflect “expected future plan investments in equities or
other asset classes besides high-quality bonds.”
Clearly, the prescription given by ASOP 27 is that the equity premium (or other risk
premia) is to be included in the discount rate when the plan is anticipated to invest in
equities and other risky assets.  In the present environment, the equity risk premium
amounts to several percent per annum and equity allocations frequently represent a
majority or near majority of plan assets.  Thus, for such plans today, ASOP 27 holds that
use of the risk-free rate is outside of the actuarial standard of practice.
G Statement No. 87 of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FAS 87), Accounting for Pensions by Employers
FAS 87 provides the standards of accounting for private employers who sponsor defined
benefit pension plans.  The priority of pension accounting is to recognize pension cost
over the service period of each employee covered by the plan.  This objective leads, in
part, to the choice of an accrued benefit actuarial cost method since such methods do
not spread costs over aggregations of employees.  The chosen method is a modification
of an earlier actuarial method often identified as Projected Unit Credit (PUC).
The Projected Unit Credit method assigns to each year of service for each employee a
pro rata share of the benefit that will have been earned upon separation from service,
reflecting an estimate of any past or future wages that may be taken into account by the
defined benefit formula.  If, for example, an actuary assumes that an employee, hired at
age 35 will retire at age 65 and will have a pay history at age 65 that entitles him to an
annual retirement benefit of $30,000, the method will dictate that $1000 of that benefit be
allocated to each of the thirty years of service.
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If that employee is now 50 years of age, the method will recognize $15,000 of the
projected $30,000 benefit as having been accrued to date and will recognize an
additional $1000 to be earned in the current accounting year.  The $15,000 benefit,
multiplied by an appropriate annuity factor and discounted for the period prior to the
commencement of the benefit, becomes the Projected Benefit Obligation (PBO)
attributable to this employee.  The PBO  for the plan will be the sum for all current
participants of the plan including the remaining annuity value for all those no longer
actively employed.  The $1000 of benefit to be allocated to the current period will also be
multiplied and discounted by the same factors.  The resulting value is called the Service
Cost (SC)  for this employee and will be aggregated across employees to yield the
plan’s Service Cost for this period.  Using the language of traditional actuarial writings,
the PBO  would be called the Accrued Liability (AL)  under the PUC method.  The SC
would be called the Normal Cost (NC)  under the PUC method.
Under the traditional PUC method, the annual cost for the plan would then be
determined as: AMTNC + , where the amortizations are periodic payments with a
present value equal to the Unfunded Accrued Liability which is the difference between
AL  and the Actuarial Value of Assets (AAV) : PBO-AAV .  The AAV  is called the
Market Related Value of Assets (MRV)  under FAS 87.  The amortization amount for the
current period would depend upon the history of events that created the divergence
between the (AAV)  and the (PBO) .  Such items as an existing difference at the
commencement of the plan, or a difference created by changes to the benefit formula of
the plan or to changes in actuarial assumptions, or to differences over time between
actual and assumed experience (actuarial gain or loss) would be amortized over various
fixed periods.
FAS 87 modifies this method in several ways:
· The amortizations in the traditional method include interest on the unfunded accrued
liability in each amortization element.  FAS 87 separates the interest component and
applies it to the PBO  and the MRV  separately.  The unfunded accrued liability
arising from the initial application of FAS 87 and any changes therein attributable to
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changes in the plan formula or actuarial assumptions are spread (amortized) over
time without interest.  The gain or loss is accumulated (the asset component of gain
and loss is included herein only after it has entered into the MRV ) and when it
exceeds an optional buffer zone known as a “corridor” it is spread over time without
interest.
· The interest component applied to the PBO  is computed using a discount rate
identified as the “settlement rate”.  This same rate, designated i below is also used to
compute the PBO  itself and the SC .  It is determined at each valuation date based
on the returns available on high-quality fixed income securities or annuities.  In the
sense that it contains no equity risk premium and does not take the plan’s asset
allocation into account, it is conceptually similar to the risk-free rate used elsewhere
in this paper.  ASOP 27 identifies this as a “prescribed rate” and exempts it from the
general ASOP 27 rules pertaining to the selection of an investment return range.
· The interest component applied to the MRV  is computed using an expected long-
term rate of return on plan assets that is consistent with the ASOP 27 rules.  This
rate designated j below is generally left unchanged for several years.
The PUC formula may then be reconstituted as: AMT-jMRVSCiPBO ++ .  Herein,
amortizations are without interest.  Amortization of accumulated gains or losses only
considers such gains or losses outside of the corridor.  The asset component of gains
and losses only recognizes the difference in actual versus expected return to the extent
that the difference has been filtered through the averaging process used to develop the
MRV .  As in most ACM’s, the special treatment of the divergence between asset
assumptions and experience amounts to an extra degree of smoothing.
H Corporate Diversification
We generalize the development of the diversification that arises when previously non-
diversified companies purchase each other's shares in their own pension plans.  We do
so absent tax considerations.  In what follows, upper case, e.g., G  identify matrices and
column vectors; singly subscripted lower case, e.g., kg , designate row vectors
embedded in matrices; subscripted upper case, e.g., iE , and doubly-subscripted lower
case, e.g., k,ig , are scalars.  We start before any cross-ownership exists and assume
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that each of n  companies ,n)(i 1=  has issued one share of stock equal in value to the
firm asset:
ii AE =
A}{A}{EE ii ===
Further, each of m  investors ,m)(k 1=  has a preferred portfolio which is expressed as
fractions of each company’s one share.
ownership-co to prior tioncapitaliza market total
portfolio market the of value wealthtotal
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As in Section IV, each company, i , purchases fractional interests, i,jf , in each other
company, j , and issues new shares, each equal in value to ii AE = , exactly sufficient to
accomplish the purchase.  The new market capitalization of company i  is:
i
T
iii EfAE +=
where }{ff i,ji =  is a row vector of company i ’s fractional holdings of each other
company’s market capitalization.
Although it is not necessary that 0³i,if , we suppose this will generally be so.  The
various ownership interests may be summarized in a cross-ownership matrix:
}{f}{fF i,ji ==
The generalization of equation (4) of Section IV then becomes:
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111     nxn nx      nxnx
F EAE += (5)
where the market capitalization Ei Tn  now exceeds the market portfolio Wi
T
m .  Because
any investor transactions that may have occurred during the diversification process did
not require any net cash (such a transaction might entail the exchange of newly issued
shares of company i  for an equal value of shares held in company j ), neither the
market portfolio nor aggregate investor wealth has changed.  But investors no longer
necessarily hold their desired fractions of each firm’s value, represented by AG .  This is
true even for investors who participated in none of the transactions.  From the
relationship in (5), defining nI  as the nn x  identity matrix, we derive:
A)EF-(In =
AG)EF-(IG n =
Define: )F-(IGH n=
AGEH =
This means that investors can achieve their preferred portfolios by acquiring fractions of
the market capitalization vector E  in accordance with H .  The thk  investor selects the
thk  row vector of H , kh  and owns:
AgEh kk =
Like G , H  is an nm x  matrix of weights, but unlike G , its columns each sum to less
than one.  This is because H  is applied to market capitalizations that are inflated by
cross-ownership.  As does AG , EH  represents the market portfolio, that portion of the
total market capitalization that is held by public investors.  Each of the n  columns of H
represents the fractional public ownership of one company’s stock.  If we divide the thi
column by iA , the share price of company i , the investor allocation is now denominated
in shares.  Dividing every column of H  by the corresponding value from A , we get an
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nm x  matrix of share ownership that we designate S .  Because we have forced the
share prices to be given by A  (by initially issuing exactly one share of each), we get the
coincidental59 equality:
AGAS =
despite the fact that no value for any k,is  need equal the value for k,ig .  We note that
the market portfolio equals the aggregate publicly held shares equals the total investor
wealth equals the aggregate firm wealth:
AIWIEHASAGEI Tn
T
m
*T
n ==º==
where the central identity indicates that AS  and EH  are not only the same in the
aggregate but are, in fact, identical.
By choosing his row vector kh  in H , the investor is able to reproduce his preferred
portfolio as a weighted average of exposures to firm values given by A .  Every portfolio
that the investor might construct must also represent a weighted average of firm values
(to see this merely multiply H  by 1-)F-(In  on the right to retrieve G ).  Since kg
represents the investors preferred choice among all such pre-diversification allocations,
kh  must represent his preferred choice among all post-diversification allocations.  What
this means is that the actions of the firms in selecting equity portfolios for their pension
plans neither help nor hurt the investors in the absence of tax and bankruptcy
considerations.  With respect to taxes, this supports Black’s contention that his imperfect
hedge is perfectly adequate to enable the tax arbitrage that he seeks without additional
consequences for shareholders.
                                               
59 The only coincidence is that A represents both share prices and firm values.  The aggregate
equality would prevail in any case but A would not appear on both sides of the equation.
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I Why pbps tt <
Why is the effective rate less for equities than for fixed income?  The Internal Revenue
Code (IRC) distinguishes between ordinary income and capital gains in two ways:
· Deferral of taxes on unrealized capital gains - Although equity dividends are taxed
when paid, capital gains are not taxed until the asset is sold.
· Differential rate on realized capital gains – Even when capital gains are realized and
become taxable, the IRC has frequently applied lower rates on such gains than on
ordinary income60.
Although it is possible to trade fixed income securities and thus produce capital gains,
most of the income on fixed income securities is interest income that is taxed as earned.
In the case of bonds bought at par and held to maturity, all of the income earned is
taxable interest income.  Expected equity income consists of two components:
dividends61 and appreciation.  Appreciation may be expected to represent the majority of
total returns.
The deferral of taxes on appreciated stock delivers an annual effective rate of taxation
that is a declining convex function of the holding period.  This rate approaches zero as
the holding period extends without limit and, for those who cannot wait forever, the entire
appreciation is forgiven upon the death of the shareholder.  Thus, the pst  rate might be
represented as (h)pst  where h  represents the holding period.
In Section V, we use a 39.6% rate for pbt  which also applies to the dividend portion of
the total return on equities.  Dividends represent a small (and recently declining) fraction
                                               
60 Ordinary income marginal rates are presently 15%, 28%, 31%, 36% and 39.6%.  Realized
long term capital gains are taxed at a 10% rate for those in the lowest bracket and 20% for all
others.
61 Company repurchases of outstanding stock have come to some favor in recent years along
with lower dividend payout ratios (dividends/free cash flow).  This means that stockholders
who wish more income can sell their stock and benefit from lower rates on realized capital
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of the total expected return.  As of 8/27/99, the dividend yield on the S&P is 1.25%62
representing perhaps 1/8 of the total expected return based on historic equity premia
and the current T-bill rate.  The tax on these dividends amounts to no more than .50% of
the market value of the index and about 5% of the expected return.  Capital gains taxes
on securities held for more than one year are limited to 20% as of this writing.  The
asymptotic rate on equities approaches the full tax rate applied to the dividends only.
Thus we can expect to find pst  in the range between .05 and .225 (1/8 x .4 + 7/8 x .2).
These assumptions bear a relationship to the Miller equation for neutrality between
shareholder and corporate leverage.  Using a 15% rate for pst  in the Miller equation:
)-)(-()-( pscpb ttt 111 =
we have the left side equal to .6040 and the right side equal to .5525 implying relatively
small value to corporate leverage as an alternative to personal borrowing.
J Notation
Notation Definition Section
References
PA Plan assets IV,V, VI
PL Plan liabilities IV,V, VI, App E
PPP -LAE = Plan value IV, V, VI, App E
BA Business assets IV, App H
BL Business liabilities IV
BBB -LAE = Business value IV, App H
BP EEE += Firm market capitalization IV
ct Tax rate – corporate IV,V, App C, D, I
                                                                                                                                           
gains; those who do not sell continue to enjoy the benefits of deferral and anticipated
differential rates in the future.
62 Dave’s Investment World, http://www.magma.ca/~davef/fundamentals.html*, 8/27/99.
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pbt Tax rate – personal – bonds IV,V, App I
pst Tax rate – personal – equity IV,V, App I
r Rate of return – riskless IV,V
~
q Rate of return – equities, stochastic IV
? Rate of return –realized equities – Tepper IV
_
q Rate of return – equities, expected IV
a Equity fraction – assets IV, V
b Equity fraction – liabilities IV, V
)r-(qe aa 1
~~
+= Rate of return – a-portfolio, stochastic IV
)r-(qe
__
aa 1+= Rate of return – a-portfolio, expected IV
},{ ba A/L pairs – define CB plan design strategy IV, V, VI
},{ 00 ba Initial values – A/L pair V
PAF = Value of fund – Tepper IV
PD )A-(F a1= Assets – Fixed Income – Tepper IV
PS AF a= Assets – Equity – Tepper IV
LG Gain from corporate leverage – Miller IV
LB Corporate borrowing – Miller IV
iA Business asset value – firm i IV
}{AA i= Business asset values – an 1 x n  vector IV
}{g}{gG k,ik == Portfolio weight matrix – shareholder k IV, App H
ni An 1 x n  vector of ones IV, App H
iE Market capitalization – firm i IV, App H
}{EE i= Market capitalizations – an 1 x n  vector IV, App H
*
iE Portion of iE  not cross-owned IV, App H
}{EE *i
* = An 1 x n  vector of *iE IV, App H
}{f}{fF i,ji == Cross-ownership matrix App H
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}{h}{hH k,ik == Portfolio weight matrix – applied to market
capitalization vector E
App H
}{s}{sS k,ik == Share ownership matrix App H
*
Ai Realized return on assets V
*
Li Investment crediting rate on balances V, App A, E
i Discount (settlement) rate under FAS 87 VI, App E
j Expected return on assets under FAS 87 VI, App E
s Salary increase rate VI, App A, E
x Age at hire App A, B, E
t Years since hire at beginning of year V, VI, App A, B, E
x
t
tx Cs)(C +=+ 1 Compensation – year ]1,[ +tt VI, App A, E
tPBO FAS 87 Projected Benefit Obligation at
beginning of year ]1,[ +tt
VI, App E, G
1+tSC FAS 87 Service Cost at end of year
]1,[ +tt
VI, App E, G
tMRV FAS 87 Market Related Value of assets at
beginning of year
VI, App E, G
tAL PUC accrued liability at beginning of year VI, App E, G
1+tNC PUC normal cost at end of year ]1,[ +tt VI, App E, G
tAAV PUC actuarial asset value at beginning of
year ]1,[ +tt
VI, App E, G
k% Compensation credit/compensation VI, App E
65a Value for 65 year-old, annuity of $1/year App A
N, N', A Amortization spread factors App E
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Figure 1
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Figure 2
Compensation and Accrued Pension Benefit
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Figure 4
Defined Benefit - Four Employers
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Annual Accruals
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Figure 6
Cash Balance Transition Schemes
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Figure 5
Alternative Cash Balance Plans
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